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ABSTRACT 
The George W. Bush administration offered two rationales for the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  First and foremost, the invasion would eliminate the 
threat that the Iraqi regime headed by Saddam Hussein might transfer weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) to terrorist organizations.  Second, the invasion would depose the 
brutal dictatorship in Baghdad and deliver the oppressed people of Iraq from tyranny.  
After the invasion, in the absence of any Iraqi WMD stockpiles, only one of these 
original justifications for war remained viable.  As a result, the Bush administration 
realigned U.S. national security strategy and set forth a vision of peace and security 
through the democratization of the Middle East and the world.  This thesis examines the 
historical antecedents of this vision.  It also analyzes the transition in the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy from a position of pragmatic restraint and America-first 
principles to a Wilsonian vision of global pacification through the spread of democratic 
principles of governance.  Finally, the thesis reviews the various obstacles that could 
prevent the fulfillment of this vision, which has met with significant resistance in 
Afghanistan as well as Iraq.  
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This thesis analyzes the current U.S. strategy of promoting peace through the 
establishment of democratic rule in countries throughout the world.  The overall objective 
is to assess the extent to which the goal of world-wide democratization is a realistic and 
workable foundation for a national strategy.  To this end, the thesis reviews the 
intellectual origins of the goal and discusses the recurrence of this vision in U.S. national 
strategy since the nation’s founding.  It then considers the apparent root causes behind the 
eventual dominance of this idealistic vision in the national strategy of the George W. 
Bush administration.  Lastly, it examines the soundness of the strategic supposition of 
democratic peace, reviewing not only the cogency of democratic peace theory but also 
the potential effects of instituting democratic procedures – such as competitive elections 
and universal suffrage – in areas of post-conflict reconstruction as well as in regions 
burdened with deep religious and sectarian divisions, such as the Middle East.  The thesis 
identifies apparent obstacles which could hinder the success of the current strategy and 
which must be taken into account in the definition and implementation of a U.S. foreign 
policy which reflects American values but, more importantly, is both politically solvent 
and ultimately in the nation’s best interest.    
B. IMPORTANCE   
The importance of this topic is evident in light of the unexpected resistance the 
United States has faced in its attempts to promote the establishment of liberal and free 
democratic societies in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Rather than the anticipated popular 
embrace of Western–style freedoms, the liberation effort has been met with an aggressive 
insurgency and domestic strife.  The fundamental premises of the Kantian and Wilsonian 
vision of peace through democracy deserve critical analysis in light of these facts.  
Furthermore, accepting that the Kantian and Wilsonian vision may have merit as a long-
term goal, it is important to determine the potential obstacles to the successful 
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achievement of this objective.  The thesis considers the extent to which the problems 
America faces in Iraq are merely interim resistance to change or symptoms of the 
inherent shortcomings of what might be considered “gun-point Wilsonianism.”   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Historical Antecedents 
The vision of achieving peace through the organization of a world of democracies 
is not new.  Its origins can be found over two hundred years ago, and the key ideas have 
been repeated throughout history by U.S. leaders as contemporary and revered as Ronald 
Reagan.1   In his seminal work on the subject entitled Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant 
argued that lasting peace between states requires the acceptance of three “definitive 
articles.”  The first of these articles deals directly with the essential nature of individual 
state governance in a peaceful world: “The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be 
Republican.”2   He argued that only republican governments have the capacity to tame 
the aggressive warring tendencies of despotic regimes.  A nation’s populace, he argued, 
recognizes clearly the disproportionately injurious nature of war for the governed and 
thus seeks all measures to avoid it.  Clearly, as history shows, liberal regimes have not 
been immune to warlike behavior, yet these actions have been for the most part directed 
at non-liberal regimes whose intentions cannot be trusted.  Thus, the United States has 
had a series of leaders who, whether to rid the world of the devastation of war or simply 
through ideological convictions about the proper form of governance, have pursued the 
Kantian ideal through a policy that Michael Doyle has called “liberal internationalism.”3  
It is clearly this policy that the George W. Bush administration has adopted as its 
principal justification for continued U.S. action in Iraq and the greater Middle East.   
                                                 
1 Ronald Reagan, 1983/1984. "Peace and National Security," televised address to the nation, 
Washington D.C., 23 March 1983, p. 40 in the U.S. State Department, Realism, Strength, Negotiation, May 
1984. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis and New York:  Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1957), p. 11. 
3 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War and Democracy,” 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/doyle/index.html (accessed  17 February 2008). 
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The history of democratization ideals in the United States begins with one of 
America’s most respected Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, who expressed his 
earnest hope that the march of democracy would continue coming “to some parts sooner, 
to others later, but finally to all.”4  Other advocates of this idealistic vision have been 
heard throughout American history.  Perhaps the best known of these advocates remains 
Woodrow Wilson, who entreated Americans to support the nation’s involvement in the 
First World War not only for realist reasons, such as retaliation and alliance support, but 
also because, he argued, “The world must be made safe for democracy.” 5  Then, in the 
wake of the devastation of war, he championed the cause of the League of Nations, which 
would, he hoped, be composed of democratic states, dedicated to preserving a lasting 
peace. 
However, despite numerous voices in support of the advancement of freedom 
around the world, many American leaders have warned of the potential dangers of 
international involvement.  While Realpolitik has often dictated the necessity of 
American engagement abroad, a global crusade for democratic political change in the 
name of peace would have been regarded as diplomatic insanity by many leaders in U.S. 
history.  Beginning with George Washington, such opposition is unmistakable.  Indeed, 
in his farewell address, the Father of the Nation asked, “Why, by interweaving our 
destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of 
European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?”6    
2. Current U.S. Strategy 
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States found it difficult 
to develop a new, long term strategy commensurate with the emerging international  
 
                                                 
4 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Roger C. Weightman,” 24  June 1826, The Essential Thomas Jefferson, 
ed. by John Gabriel Hunt (New Jersey: Portland House, 1994), p. 333. 
5 Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on 2 April 1917, available at 
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/ (accessed 8 July 2008). 
6 President George Washington’s farewell address, 17 September 1796 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm, p. 12, (accessed on 17 May 2008). 
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circumstances.  Clearly, the promotion, widening and sustainment of peace were among 
America’s objectives.  However, the route to peace has never been unanimously agreed.  
 According to the great British historian Martin Wight, the three main traditions of 
thinking about international relations in Western societies can be described as Realism, 
Rationalism, and Revolutionism.  Wight also described the Realist approach as 
Machiavellian, the Rationalist approach as Grotian, and the Revolutionist approach as 
Kantian.  Realists emphasize the anarchical aspects of international politics:  “sovereign 
states acknowledging no political superior, whose relationships are ultimately regulated 
by warfare.”  Rationalists concentrate on “diplomacy and commerce” and other means of 
promoting “continuous and organized intercourse between these sovereign states.”  
Revolutionists stress the “concept of a society of states, or family of nations” and pursue 
the achievement of enduring international peace.7 
In the history of U.S. foreign relations, some of the ideas of policy-makers such as 
John Quincy Adams, Theodore Roosevelt and Sumner Welles can be seen as falling 
within the Realist tradition, while many of the concepts endorsed by Washington and 
Lincoln can be seen as consistent with the Rationalist tradition.  The Revolutionist 
tradition has been distinctive in emphasizing a requirement of ideological uniformity 
among states as the means to establish international peace, and the statesman in U.S. 
history most closely identified with this Kantian approach is Woodrow Wilson. 
It would, however, be an error to assume that the thinking of specific policy-
makers has always fallen under the heading of a single tradition.  Wight repeatedly 
pointed out that “the three traditions are not clear-cut pigeon-holes, but can overlap.”8  
His work was, he wrote, “an attempt to pin down and define the central principles and 
characteristic doctrines of each of the three traditions.”9  While Wight discerned 
essential differences among the three traditions, he also declared that  
                                                 
7 Martin Wight, International Theory:  The Three Traditions, edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian 
Porter (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), pp. 7-8. 
8 Ibid., p. 15. 
9 Ibid., p. 258; italics in the original. 
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…all this is merely classification and schematizing.  In all political and 
historical studies the purpose of building pigeon-holes is to reassure 
oneself that the raw material does not fit into them.  Classification 
becomes valuable, in humane studies, only at the point where it breaks 
down.  The greatest political writers in international theory almost all 
straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions, and most of these 
writers transcend their own systems.10   
While historically U.S. foreign policy has been informed by both Realist 
(Machiavellian) and Rationalist (Grotian) perspectives, some U.S. policy makers have 
also clearly professed support for a Revolutionist or Kantian/Wilsonian vision of peace 
through democratization.  Though the United States has not always had the strength or 
influence necessary to lead a global democratization movement, it has nevertheless often 
championed nations seeking liberty and self-determination.  In his inaugural address in 
2001, President Bush made it clear that this Kantian and Wilsonian vision would remain 
a tenet of American foreign policy.  He described America’s “faith in freedom and 
democracy” as “a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations.”11  However, his first 
inaugural speech was otherwise largely devoted to domestic promises.  While America, 
he said, would stand and “speak for the values that gave our nation birth,”12 such 
pronouncements were apparently not to be regarded as ultimatums to despotic regimes 
but instead suggestive urgings in the framework of a “balance of power which favors 
freedom.”  Indeed, it seemed that President Bush believed that the nation’s security 
would be assured through the realist notion of “defenses beyond challenge.” 13  
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, however, seemed to drastically reduce 
the chance that the administration would continue to patiently wait for this “seed upon the 
wind” to take root and bear fruit, particularly in areas such as the Middle East where 
militant anti-American sentiment fueled distrust and hatred for all involvement with 
Western societies and their liberal ideologies.   The attack on America ushered in a 
                                                 
10 Wight, International Theory:  The Three Traditions, p. 259; italics in the original. 
11 Inaugural Address, President George W. Bush, 20 January 2001, available at 




demand for retribution by the American people but also slowly fostered an elevated 
urgency within the administration to more actively seek the realization of America’s 
long-held Kantian/Wilsonian vision.  What had not been accomplished through the 
market and diplomacy was now ostensibly to be achieved through force.  Indeed the tone 
of the September 2002 National Security Strategy was clearly different from that of the 
2001 inaugural address. In his cover letter to the National Security Strategy President 
Bush promised that America “would actively work to bring the hope of democracy…to 
every corner of the globe.”14   
The march of freedom seemed poised to commence and, by every reasonable 
estimate, it was growing clearer that this would be a “forced march” led by the United 
States.  However, support for the goal of creating a world of democracies did not 
guarantee effective action or a long-term popular commitment, particularly if that 
commitment required significant sacrifice.    For this reason, the Kantian and Wilsonian 
ideal of global peace via democratization had to be linked to the pragmatic realism of 
national defense.  The clearest pronouncement of this link came in the President’s second 
inaugural address.  The President noted that “the survival of liberty in our land 
increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”15   
After the swift and seemingly decisive defeat of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan in late 2001, the Bush administration set about to implement the first in what 
it hoped would be a series of democratic transitions throughout the Middle East.  The 
apparently easy realization of this first step in Afghanistan struck a note of optimism that 
fulfillment of the vision was possible.  Thus, a turn towards Iraq seemed the almost 
inevitable next step in liberty’s conquest.  Again, the American people were provided 
both Realpolitik and altruistic justifications for an invasion of Iraq.   While the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq had to be eliminated, President Bush said, 
the United States also had a moral obligation to “free the Iraqi people” who had been 
                                                 
14 President’s cover letter, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, September 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, p.1 
(accessed on 6 February 2008). 
15 The Second Inaugural Address,  President George W. Bush, 20 January 2005 available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html, p.1 (accessed 6 February 2008). 
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“enslaved” by the Baathist regime.16  As expected, the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
was swift, but so also was the collapse of one of the two pillars of America’s justification 
for organizing a coalition to intervene in Iraq.  The alleged WMD were not found, and 
thus the sole remaining justification for America’s intervention in Iraq became the 
altruistic assertion that “25 million Iraqis have as much right to live in freedom as we 
do.”17 
Now, however, as America’s involvement in Iraq has continued, with little 
expectation of a near-term exit, questions have arisen about the overall feasibility of 
achieving the Kantian/Wilsonian goal.  Are the obstacles the United States is facing in 
Iraq and Afghanistan merely isolated circumstances or rather unavoidable and potentially 
recurring shortcomings in the democratization strategy?  Furthermore, to what extent is 
the Kantian and Wilsonian vision intrinsically flawed?  These questions must be 
addressed in order to achieve the desired goals of both peace and American security.    
D. OBSTACLES 
America’s protracted involvement in Iraq has evoked a flood of contrasting 
opinions about what should be done.  The conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere 
have highlighted ongoing debates about the validity of democratic peace theory and the 
potential for lasting peace through democratization. First and foremost, the elusiveness of 
the definition of a “peace inducing democracy” constitutes the first weakness of the 
theory.  Furthermore, some scholars doubt the practical feasibility of realizing the 
Kantian and Wilsonian vision.  These scholars conclude that democracies often do not 
interact as expected with either fellow democratic states or non-democratic states.  It has 
been argued that prospects for peace through democratization may be significantly 
affected by geopolitical circumstances, including the political-military predominance of 
the United States in a specific region, such as Europe.  While democracies may not be 
inclined to wage war against one another – unless a competition over resources arises – 
                                                 
16 President George W. Bush, Justification for Iraq Invasion, March 22, 2003, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html, p.1 (accessed on 15 March 2008).  
17 Guardian Unlimited Interview, George W. Bush, April 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1191531,00.html (accessed 20 May 2008). 
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the same cannot be said of relations between democratic and non-democratic nations.  
Erich Weede argues that the forcible establishment of a democracy in a non-democratic 
“neighborhood” actually increases the risk of war due to the inherent incompatibility 
between democratic and autocratic regimes.18   Thus, any causality between liberal 
governance and peace may be minimal at best, and peace may be more credibly 
associated with alternative explanations. 
Another school of thought, while supporting elements of the Kantian vision, 
recognizes that essential preconditions must be met to encourage success.  Lasting peace 
may be jeopardized, for example, by the means through which a government’s transition 
to democracy is accomplished.  In a recent paper entitled “Democratic Jihad: Military 
Intervention and Democracy,” Nils Petter Gleditsch, Lene Siljeholm Christiansen, and 
Håvard Hegre argue that, while a democratization process established through force 
might have initial success, it often creates unstable democratic nations with the potential 
for future difficulties.19    
A final significant obstacle to the success of U.S. democratization strategy is 
receiving increasingly greater investigation – that is, analyses of whether it is realistic to 
regard Western, liberal democratic values as universal, particularly in regions such as the 
Middle East.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that Kant’s optimistic vision in Perpetual Peace 
emerged during one of the fiercest revolutions the European continent has ever seen, a 
revolution that was largely aimed at overthrowing the continent’s historic religious 
authority.  As the political upheavals in much of Europe were anything but bloodless, it 
might be naïve to assume that a political transition as fundamental as democratization 
could successfully occur without significant hostility in theocratic Muslim societies 
starkly divided along religious, sectarian and cultural lines.  In truth, the installation of 
democracy in such nations can only be achieved by overthrowing the existing political 
                                                 
18 Erich Erich, “The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace through Globalization,” The Independent 
Review (Fall 2004), p. 165-186. 
19Nils Petter Gleditsch, Christiansen, Lene Siljeholm, and Hegre, Håvard, “Democratic Jihad? 
Military Intervention and Democracy,” April 2004,  
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ws21/Hegre.pdf   (accessed on 28 
February 2008).  
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structure.  Simply put, in such cases democratic transition effectively removes the highest 
religious and political authorities in the society from practical governance and eliminates 
the traditional source of societal concord, whether voluntary or forced.  The resulting 
polarization in Iraq has thus far had a severely destabilizing effect.  Thus, as America 
seeks to promote such democratic transitions around the globe, it is important to 
investigate their short and long term effects and to determine whether democratic 
governance heals or exacerbates societal divisions.  
E. MAJOR EXAMINATION 
This thesis examines the origins and implications of the current U.S. 
administration’s strategy for democratization.  More specifically, the democratization of 
Iraq seems to have become the altruistic “fallback” justification for the failure to find 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.  While the democratization objective is 
noble in its intent, its achievement faces tremendous obstacles and may prove 
considerably more costly in both treasure and blood than the American people are 
prepared to pay. The ultimate question is the extent to which the administration’s Kantian 
and Wilsonian vision of a world of democracies is a workable foundation for a national 
strategy.   
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that there are inherent limits to the 
fulfillment of this vision.  The obstacles to the forceful promotion of democracy must be 
kept in mind to avoid recriminations about unfulfilled expectations and, above all, to 
maximize the chances for success in the cases in which the necessary conditions can be 
satisfied.    
F. SOURCES AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 
U.S. and European sources, both primary and secondary, are examined in this 
investigation.  Chapter II reviews the intellectual antecedents of the current strategy.  The 
writings of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Jefferson, and Woodrow Wilson, among others, 
highlight the historical development of the democratization vision, sometimes called 
“democratic peace theory.”  This chapter includes a discussion of the intellectual 
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opposition to this theory and cites the contrasting ideas of prominent Americans such as 
George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and John Quincy Adams.    
Chapter III identifies key aspects of the strategy of democratization that has been 
pursued by the George W. Bush administration since 2001.  The primary source 
documents include the 2002 and 2006 editions of the National Security Strategy of the 
United States, and various speeches and other works by the President and other 
administration officials.  
Chapter IV explores the obstacles to the realization of U.S. democratization 
strategy.  Beginning first with the Kantian and Wilsonian vision itself, the thesis 
discusses the feasibility of achieving the vision and the substantial obstacles facing its 
realization.  The thesis also examines the impediments affecting America’s 
democratization efforts today in the Middle East.  These impediments may prove to be 
lasting obstacles to the fulfillment of the strategy.     
Chapter V summarizes the conclusions of the investigation.    
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II. INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS 
The pursuit of lasting peace is one of the noble undertakings of civilized 
humanity.  As history has shown, however, conflict has arisen often in spite of our 
greatest efforts.  The philosopher Immanuel Kant rightly acknowledged that “[t]he state 
of peace among men living side by side is not the natural (status naturalis); the natural 
state is one of war.”20  He went on to argue that only republican governments have the 
capacity to tame these aggressive warring tendencies.  The United States has had a series 
of leaders who, whether motivated to rid the world of the devastation of war or simply 
through ideological convictions about the proper form of governance, have pursued this 
Kantian ideal.  The most notable proponent of this ideal was President Woodrow Wilson.  
This chapter investigates the origins of President Wilson’s Kantian idealism and 
counterposes selected views of more realist-inspired U.S. leaders such as President John 
Quincy Adams.  It highlights the clear and distinct contrast between the two schools of 
thought and their opposing views about the potential for a democracy-based peace and 
America’s obligation to promote that peace.   
A. THE KANTIAN TRADITION AND THE FOUNDING IDEALS OF THE 
UNITED STATES  
Though recognition of the advantages of representative government can be traced 
back as far as ancient Greece,21 its potential impact on inter-state peace was first publicly 
argued in a systematic fashion by Immanuel Kant in 1795 in his seminal work entitled 
Perpetual Peace.   In section II of the work, Kant outlined what he proposed as the three 
“Definitive Articles for Perpetual Peace Among States.”  The first (and likely the 
preeminent) of these articles reflected his belief that a world of constitutional republics 
might guarantee peace.  “The Civil Constitution of Every State,” Kant wrote, “Should Be 
Republican,”22 for a world of constitutional republics would, in essence, end all war.  
                                                 
20 Kant, Perpetual Peace. 
21 J.A.O. Larsen, “The Judgment of Antiquity on Democracy,” Classical Philology, vol. 49, no. 1 
(January 1954). 
22 Kant, p.11. 
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Kant’s reasoning was straightforward.  He argued that, other than for reasons of self-
defense, a nation’s populace would not rationally choose to endure the hardships of war.  
Thus, as all constitutional republics would instead adopt a cautious defense posture, no 
aggressors would exist and, and as a result, war would be completely eliminated.  Kant 
wrote, 
…if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war 
should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), 
nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in 
commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities 
of war.  Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the 
costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the 
devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load 
themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and 
that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.23  
In essence, according to Kant, representative government would ensure peace by 
providing effective influence to those most likely to be harshly affected by war.   
The attraction of this utopian idea was predictable, particularly in the wake of the 
European Enlightenment and the emergence of a new principle of legitimacy in 
government, “the consent of the governed.”  In fact, plucked from its theoretical confines, 
this legitimacy principle found its political embodiment in the American Declaration of 
Independence, which professed the self-evident truth that “all men are created equal” 
(emphasis added).  While Christianity held such to be the view of God, a country’s 
avowal of this maxim in the temporal realm implied the formation of a new type of 
political regime, one that would be (according to Kant’s theory) disposed to avoid foreign 
conflicts.  In essence, if Kant’s theory was correct, extending this historically 
unprecedented equality of political status for the individual24  to other nations would 
extricate America from the future conflicts inherent in the warring tendencies of 
autocratically ruled states. Hope in a Kantian-style global peace through liberal 
                                                 
23 Kant, pp.12-13. 
24 In 1776, when the Declaration of Independence was published, suffrage was limited to free white 
men holding a certain amount of property.  The ideal expressed in the Declaration helped to extend the 
suffrage over time to all citizens.  Thomas Jefferson wrote, “"Nothing is more certainly written in the book 
of fate than that these people [American slaves] are to be free.”  This quotation is reproduced from Thomas 
Jefferson’s autobiography and is engraved on the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C.   
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pacification was also apparent in the philosophical ideas espoused by many of the most 
noteworthy founding fathers of the United States.  Thomas Jefferson, the ideological 
wellspring of American liberty, clearly espoused a belief in the redemptive power of 
democratic rule.  Yet the principal author of America’s Declaration of Independence also 
seemed to hold an ambitious wish for the expansion of democratic liberty outside the 
United States, expressing an earnest hope that the march of democracy would continue 
coming “to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally, to all.”25   Seemingly even 
more convinced later in life, in 1821 Jefferson wrote to John Adams, “In short, the flames 
kindled on the 4th of July, 1776, have spread over too much of the globe to be 
extinguished by the feeble engines of despotism; on the contrary, they will consume these 
engines and all who work them.”26  These words reveal what some might regard as a 
messianic vision of global tranquility through the continued expansion of representative 
government. 
B. WOODROW WILSON AND LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM 
The recognition of the advantages of democracy and the philanthropic wish for 
the global expansion of its privileges undeniably constitute a noble ideal.  However, the 
most notable expression of “liberal internationalism” in American foreign policy 
occurred a century later under liberalism’s most zealous apostle, President Woodrow 
Wilson.   Desperate to end the bloodbath of a brutal war and determined to protect the 
world from the senseless carnage which by this time had claimed an entire generation of 
European young men, President Wilson opened a new chapter in the long-standing 
American tradition supporting the global expansion of liberalized polity.   
For a clear understanding of the significance of this dominating principle in 
Wilson’s foreign policy one must clearly examine his thinking, the source of his 
conviction, and the ultimate results of its implementation.  As Henry Adams said, 
“Readers might judge for themselves what share the individual possessed in creating or 
                                                 
25 Thomas Jefferson, The Essential Thomas Jefferson, ed. John Gabriel Hunt (New Jersey: Portland 
House, 1994), p. 333. 
26 Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington D.C.: 
Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1907), p. 334. 
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shaping the nation; but whether it was small or great, the nation could be understood only 
by studying the individual.”27  For “at crucial moments, at turning points, when factors 
appear more or less equally balanced, chance, individuals and their decisions … can 
determine the course of history.”28   
Victory at the Somme had cost the British 419,654 casualties, the French, nearly 
200,000 in exchange for an advance of a mere seven miles.29    The German casualty 
figure, though debated, is estimated to have been as high as high as 680,000.30  By the 
end of the First World War total casualties would be staggering.  A combined excess of 
8.5 million were dead and over 20 million wounded.31   As incomprehensible as the death 
toll was, perhaps even more frightful was the grotesque exposure of the wanton depravity 
of human nature unleashed in the rage of the war and made possible through the 
technological advancements of the age. Wilfred Owen, a British soldier, wrote a famous 
poem before he was killed in the trenches.  It accurately conveys the depths to which 
organized humanity was willing to go to fight for the ideological principle of nationalism.  
The subject of the poem is the horrors of gas warfare and the final lines are perhaps the 
most potent. 
 
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace 
Behind the wagon that we flung him in, 
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face, 
His hanging face like a devil’s sick of sin; 
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood 
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, 
                                                 
27 Henry Adams, A History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Jefferson 
and Madison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 406, cited in John Lamberton Harper, 
American Visions of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 1. 
28 Isaiah Berlin, quoted in Ramin Jahanbegloo, “Philosophy and Life: An Interview,” New York 
Review of Books, 39, no. 10 (May 28, 1992), 51, cited in Harper, p. 2. 
29 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 285. 
30 German casualty estimate available at http://history.sandiego.edu/GEN/ww1/somme.html (accessed 
8 August 2008). 
31 World War I casualty figures available at http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html 
(accessed 8 August 2008). 
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Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud 
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues, − 
 
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest 
To children ardent for some desperate glory, 
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est 
Pro patria mori. 32 
 
It was against this backdrop that Woodrow Wilson, one of the most influential 
political figures in the modern age, emerged.  Born in 1856, he was both a product and 
champion of the ideas of the modern world.  The third of four children born to a 
Presbyterian minister, his family had been involved on both sides of burgeoning 
American political issues. While his grandfather had been the publisher of an abolitionist 
newspaper in Ohio, his parents’ relocation to Virginia in 1851 engendered a familial 
association with the Confederate cause and subsequent support of slavery.  Nevertheless, 
his sense of moral certainty and compassion for humanity were no doubt the result of his 
family’s close religious affiliation.  Indeed, the beginning of his term in office in 1913 
was marked by economic and social legislation aimed at helping the “little man” by 
stifling the “unfair” practices of big corporations.  The Clayton Antitrust Act, which held 
individual officers accountable for corporate violations, and the Federal Farm Loan Act, 
extending low-interest, long-term loans to farmers, are two significant pieces of 
legislation characteristic of his early administration.   
The President’s religious and moral convictions would find, however, no outlet 
more significant than the foreign policy of his second term.  In the waning moments of 
the age of imperialism, his was a Kantian vision of a new age of geopolitics dominated 
by peaceful republics eliminating the atrocities of war.  True to his Presbyterian religious 
heritage, he proposed a policy framework for world order that he called a “covenant.”   
His dedication to this strategic vision and his employment of the American military in its 
                                                 
32 Wilfred Owen, “Dulce et Decorum Est,” http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/19389 
(accessed 8 August 2008). 
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pursuit changed the world.  Though interrupted by the rise of 20th century fascism and 
communism, his vision might rightly even be seen as having laid the fertile seeds of the 
modern democratic European community.   
The impact and duration of President Woodrow Wilson’s political legacy, 
however, would have likely been different under alternative geopolitical circumstances.  
As Stanley Weintraub has noted, if the President had been unable to hang his reelection 
campaign on the assertion that he had “kept us out of war,” he would have likely lost to a 
powerful Republican candidate, the former Governor of New York, Charles Evans 
Hughes.33  Yet, the war was destroying Europe and Wilson’s non-intervention had won 
favor with the U.S. electorate, unwilling to partake in what Zara Steiner has aptly 
described as “one of the most tragic and inhumane periods in European history.”34  It 
might thus be asserted that President Wilson’s true legacy begins at precisely the point 
where he resisted the country’s isolationist tendencies, and chose to “marshal the might 
of his country to end the carnage of the World War.”35   
On 2 April 1917, an extraordinary session of Congress was called for what would 
become one of the most famous addresses of a U.S. president in modern times.  President 
Woodrow Wilson, in his second term of office, was asking for a Declaration of War 
against the Imperial German Government.  The request was itself extraordinary as the 
administration had been previously committed to American non-intervention in Europe.  
Yet a closer look at the speech reveals more than simply an action seemingly out 
of character for the administration.  American entry into the war was to lay the 
foundation for a completely new geopolitical reality.   Though loaded with a stern 
indictment of the Imperial German Government, the most extraordinary aspect of the 
President’s address was his heartfelt conviction in the redemptive power of liberal 
governance.  He maintained that it was imperative that the United States take action to 
spread democratic ideals for the sake of the world’s future.  Indeed, though calling for 
                                                 
33 Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 167. 
34 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p. vi. 
35 Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 2. 
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retaliation due to the fact that “American ships have been sunk” and “American lives 
taken,” the President’s most famous statements are completely void of such historical, 
realist justifications for military action.  Instead, the President quickly widened the intent 
of military commitment and appealed to a broader sense of global altruism.  The conflict 
was not an isolated European event, but a “war against all nations” in which the 
“challenge is to all mankind.”36   He asserted America’s gladness to fight for “the 
privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience.”  Finally, in 
what has become perhaps his most famous utterance, President Wilson insisted that “[t]he 
world must be made safe for democracy.”37      
What is important to note is that even prior to America’s entry into World War I, 
one can see the clear and distinct enunciation of the radical change in U.S. justifications 
for war that Wilson was about to make.  Historically, the causes of U.S. mobilization for 
war were largely issues of territory, retaliation, or authority.  It might be argued that less 
than 20 years earlier, President McKinley’s call for U.S. action against Spain had 
smacked of altruistic intentions.  However, the sheer inaccuracy of his culturally elitist 
rhetoric suggests that his call to arms was a self-deceptive rationalization that masked 
geopolitical imperatives.  The Filipinos, McKinley argued, were unfit for self-
government—and therefore “there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and 
to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them.”38  This 
remarkable yet bizarre justification − Margaret Leech called it “the greatest absurdity of 
the expansionist propaganda” − was provided for the invasion and occupation for half a 
century of a country which at the time was home to over 6.5 million people, all of whom, 
through the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church, “were in full enjoyment of the 
blessings of Christianity.”39   
                                                 
36 Woodrow Wilson, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/  (accessed 8 August 2008). 
37 Ibid. 
38 McKinley quoted in Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1959), p. 345; italics added. 
39 Leech, p. 324.  
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President Wilson’s address, however, marked a complete break with such 
precedent.   Wilson’s rhetoric was not the poorly veiled imperialism of McKinley 
founded on the notion of a U.S. obligation to forcibly civilize peoples regarded as 
racially, culturally, and religiously backward.  Instead, the President’s intentions were to 
forever alter the world political stage through liberal ideology.  Indeed, after this point in 
history, conflict lines became increasingly justified by political ideologies.  In 1917, 
President Wilson justified American involvement in the European conflict as an essential 
challenge of morally superior democratic governance against inferior and insidious 
autocratic rule.  Throughout the following century, this view of America’s mission 
became the recurrent rationale for the involvement of U.S. troops abroad from Belleau 
Wood to Normandy to Baghdad. 
The German threat notwithstanding, President Wilson’s actions in the First World 
War were clearly born of his religiously inspired faith in a Kantian vision of a new, 
peaceful order of world politics based upon the cooperative interactions of friendly 
democracies.  However, while the philosophical justification of this ambitious vision 
seemed sound, the U.S. Senate’s rejection of Wilson’s proposed League of Nations was 
the beginning of an ongoing debate on the nation’s commitment to this vision and, more 
so, its willingness to sacrifice for its practical application.  The post-war establishment of 
a peaceful and benign Weimar Republic seemed in 1919 to embody Allied confidence in 
the potential benefits of liberal governance oriented towards the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.  However, the birth of fascism and Bolshevism had cast long shadows on the 
previous expectations of perpetual peace.  Within two decades after World War II 
though, empirical evidence slowly emerged which seemed to vindicate Kant’s vaunted 
theories and Wilson’s optimistic hopes.   
C. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
In 1961, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was 
established by Act of Congress.  Part of the mission of this agency was to conduct 
research to foster a “better understanding of how the basic structure of lasting peace may 
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be established.” 40   Three years later, citing the goals set forth for ACDA, criminologist 
Dean Babst published the first empirical analysis examining whether regime type serves 
as an accurate indication of the propensity for two countries to make war with each other.   
Babst considered relations between freely elected, or democratic, governments.  Using 
Quincy Wright’s list of major wars since 1500, Babst conducted a statistical analysis of 
the outbreak of war between two countries to determine whether any correlation could be 
found to the countries’ respective modes of governance.  Regarding the First World War, 
Babst found statistical significance in the difference between the conflict potential of 
differing regime types.  That is, elective governments had a lower conflict potential.  
Similar statistical significance was found to exist in the interactions of regimes in the 
Second World War.  Though no inquiry was made regarding wars from World War II to 
1963, Babst concluded that “the existence of independent nations with elective 
governments greatly increases the chance for the maintenance of peace.”  Furthermore, 
he wrote, “What is important is the form of government, not the national character.”41     
Babst’s work received significant attention and seemed to further validate the 
assumptions of the “democratic peace” theory associated with Kant and Wilson.  Follow-
on studies were conducted by Melvin Small and J. David Singer supporting Babst and 
confirming, in fact, an absence of war between democratic states.  Perhaps, however, the 
most extensive discussion of the peaceful effects of democratic polity came in a 1983 
investigation conducted by Michael Doyle.  In his study, entitled “Kant, Liberal Legacies, 
and Foreign Affairs,” Doyle argued that “liberal peace” does exist and cannot be 
explained away through realist argumentation.  He showed a persuasive statistical 
association linking peace and liberal governance apart from other external variables such 
as wealth and geography.  Through the marginalization of balance of power politics, 
liberal or democratic governance has a pacifying effect due to three forces manifest in 
liberal regimes. (1) The citizens of liberal states must bear the burden of war. (2) Liberal 
republics respect one another. (3) Economic advantage and mutually recognized 
                                                 
40 An Act To Establish A United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Public Law 87-297, 
September 27, 1961. 
41 Dean Babst, “Elective Governments — A Force for Peace,” The Wisconsin Sociologist, 3 (1, 1964), 
pp. 9-14. 
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“cosmopolitan law” fosters peaceful interaction among liberal states.  These conditions, 
Doyle argued, produce a “liberal zone of peace” harkening back to Kant’s “pacific 
union.”42  Doyle conceded, however, that liberalism does not preclude war between 
liberal and illiberal states. Doyle stated that, “Even though liberal states have become 
involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states 
have yet to engage in war with one another.”  He concluded that “the peaceful intent and 
restraint that liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announces 
the possibility of a world peace this side of the grave or of world conquest.  It has 
strengthened the prospects for a world peace established by the steady expansion of a 
separate peace among liberal societies.”43  In essence, it would seem that initial statistical 
evidence has vindicated Kant’s theory, yet global altruism has for many been a weak 
justification for American sacrifice.  Despite the philanthropic intentions of the promoters 
of liberal internationalism, ardent voices of skepticism and caution have been heard 
throughout successive epochs of American history. 
D. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM 
In his 1941 article entitled “The American Century” Henry Luce argued against 
American efforts to intervene in Europe (and across the globe) for the sake of political 
ideology.  Luce wrote, “Emphatically our only alternative to isolationism is not to 
undertake to police the whole world nor to impose democratic institutions on all mankind 
including the Dalai Lama and the good shepherds of Tibet.”44  Luce’s sentiments were 
not the sarcastic observations of a dissident tycoon, but instead echoed the caution of 
many of America’s most favored sons.    
                                                 
42 In Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant described a union of pacific states which would result from the 
achievement of three conditions: (1) the establishment of states founded upon republican constitutions; (2) 
the establishment of a “law of nations” which would govern the peaceful interaction between states; and (3) 
the establishment of norms of world citizenship oriented around “universal hospitality.”  
43 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 
12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), p. 213. 
44 Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Life, February 7, 1941, reprinted in Michael J. Hogan, The 
Ambiguous Legacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 20. 
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Perhaps the earliest admonition can be seen in the words of the Father of the 
Nation himself, President George Washington.  Washington had risked life, wealth and 
reputation to command the Continental Army against the British forces.  Then, despite 
significant reluctance, he had served as America’s first President, taking the helm through 
some of the most formative years of the nation’s existence on the world stage.  In his 
farewell address at the close of his Presidency, Washington outlined his vision of what he 
considered the foundation of a prudent foreign policy for the country.  “The great rule of 
conduct for us,” he stated, “in regards to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial 
relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.”45  Furthermore, 
leaving no room for misunderstanding, he emphatically reminded America that “‘Tis our 
true policy to steer clear of permanent Alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”46   
His reticence in this respect was emulated by his successor, John Adams.  However, it 
was Adam’s son, the future president, John Quincy Adams, who most clearly identified 
the necessity of an American foreign policy disassociated from ideological 
interventionism.     
It was during his service as Secretary of State that John Quincy Adams uttered his 
summation of his dedication to American disentanglement.  In a Fourth of July Address 
in 1821, he acknowledged America’s global goodwill but expressed a cautious 
admonition against what Walter McDougall has called “global meliorism.”47  Adams 
stated:  
 
                                                 
45 Worthington Chauncey Ford, The Writings of George Washington (New York City: G.P. Putnam's 
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Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence, has been or shall be 
unfurled, there will her [America’s] heart, her benedictions and her 
prayers be.  But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.  
She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.  She is the 
champion and vindicator only of her own.48 
In his book, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign 
Policy, Samuel Bemis noted that “From the beginning John Quincy Adams had thought 
like Washington on foreign affairs.”  In his famous letters of “Marcellus” in 1794, Adams 
wrote, “It is our duty to remain, the peaceful and silent, though sorrowful spectators of 
the European scene.”49  Bemis notes that such “advocacy of Abstention had originally 
commended him to the serious attention of the first President.”50  In fact, as early as 1796 
Adams had defined what he considered the unique “American System” of polity as 
distinctly opposed to the “European System.”  The difference between the two was as 
vast as the ocean that separated the continents.  He saw the two as “two separate systems” 
which existed in “two spheres.”51  The first challenge to this ideal came not during his 
term as President (1825-1829), but instead as Secretary of State in the Monroe 
administration (1817-1825).  Acting as agent in the collective mediation between Spain 
and her colonies, the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia and Austria) urged the United States 
to become a member of a “League of Peace.”  In 1820, Adams charged the U.S. Minister 
to Russia, Henry Middleton, to diplomatically decline Czar Alexander’s overtures.  
According to Adams’s message to Middleton,      
The political system of the United States is also extra-European.  To stand 
in firm and cautious independence of all entanglement in the European 
system, has been a cardinal point of their policy under every 
administration of their government from the peace of 1783 to this day…It 
may be observed that for the repose of Europe, as well as of America, the 
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European and American political systems should be kept as separate and 
distinct from each other as possible.52 
Yet, soon after, with the backing of the Holy Alliance (founded in 1815 by 
Austria, Prussia and Russia), France intervened on the royalist side in the civil war in 
Spain, Britain’s ally since the first Peninsular War, and set its sights on Spanish interests 
in the New World.  In fact, the Holy Alliance powers had deliberately isolated the British 
by announcing that if Great Britain should interfere to assist the Spanish 
constitutionalists, they would come to the aid of France.  London had little recourse but 
to dissolve Great Britain’s cooperation with the Holy Alliance powers and look westward 
across the Atlantic for help in checking the intervention of France in Latin America and 
the even more threatening possibility of the revival of a French colonial empire and 
French sea power.  As a result, in 1823 an alliance was proposed by the British Foreign 
Minister George Canning between the United States and the United Kingdom.   
The American response to the proposal by Foreign Minister Canning was of 
monumental importance at the time and long remained a hallmark of American policy.  
Bemis notes that, “Jefferson considered the question the most momentous since the 
independence of the United States.”53  As with the Wilson administration a century later, 
circumstances forced America to make a historic choice between two distinct and 
opposing paths.  A clear threat to American interests had been identified.  According to 
Bemis, “a successful intervention by the Holy Alliance in South America now might 
mean an attack soon after on the United States.”  Additionally, an alliance with Britain 
would allow the United States to stand in principle on the side of liberty.  The 
constitutional governments of Britain and Spain54 had an ideological affinity with the 
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fledging American democracy, and allying with these governments would demonstrate 
ideological solidarity against the autocratic regimes of the Holy Alliance.  Alternatively, 
by rejecting the offer the United States could remain true to the isolationist tradition of its 
founders.   Indeed, an assent to the British proposals would have flown directly in the 
face of established, Washington-inspired American neutrality.   
Both Jefferson and Madison urged President Monroe to accept the British offer.  
Jefferson was convinced that using the alliance to successfully repel the threat to the New 
World would help “to introduce and establish the American System, ‘of keeping out of 
our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to interfere with the 
affairs of our nations.”55  Bemis notes, “If a war resulted it would be our [America’s] war 
as well as Europe’s war, with Great Britain on our side.”56  Madison’s inclination 
towards the British proposal foreshadowed the policy adopted by Wilson almost a 
century later.  He envisaged the situation as a monumental clash between rivaling 
political ideologies: “With the British power and navy combined with our own we have 
nothing to fear from the rest of the nations and in the great struggle of the Epoch between 
liberty and despotism, we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former in this hemisphere at 
least.”57   
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, however, remained unmoved and 
reasserted his characteristic advocacy of abstention.  Adams described the situation as “a 
very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy 
Alliance and at the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain.  It would be more 
candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, 
than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war.”58  Clearly, 
Secretary Adams saw America’s “isolation from foreign entanglements” as more 
important than its ideological affinities with kindred liberal governments.  In the end, the 
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occasion inspired a systematic clarification of foreign policy.  “The answer to be given to 
Baron Tuyll,” Adams told the President, “the instructions to Mr. Rush [Minister to 
Britain] relative to the proposals of Mr. Canning, those to Mr. Middleton at St. 
Petersburg, and those to the Minister who must be sent to France, must all be parts of a 
combined system of policy and adapted to each other.”59  
The Monroe Doctrine was born.  While the doctrine would forever bear the name 
of the fifth president, it is undeniably a credit to his Secretary of State that this doctrine 
became a lasting rhumb line around which the United States could navigate its future 
foreign policy.  In the end it might be said that, while the Monroe Doctrine sought to 
keep European power politics out of the Americas, its assertions marked another 
underlying conviction –  that is, an aversion to U.S. commitment of force and finance in 
the name of political ideology.    
E. COMPETING NARRATIVES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
While reduction of the basic foreign policy orientation of all U.S. administrations 
since the Constitutional Convention into two distinct camps would be an 
oversimplification, it is reasonable to state that since the nineteenth century American 
foreign policy has been the outgrowth of two competing self-images.  Walter McDougall 
has described these self-images in biblical terms.   He has depicted the first as a nation 
styled as an Old Testament promised land whose people, like the Jews, existed largely in 
political and religious isolation.  The alternate view portrays America as divinely blessed 
with a New Testament–style obligation to “evangelize” the world, dispensing republican 
governance and bourgeois Protestant values to those suffering under discredited regimes 
of oppression.60   
In the early twentieth century, however, globalizing technology and the rise of 
aggressive and expanding ideologies, such as Marxism and National Socialism, rendered 
                                                 
59 Bemis (p. 385) provides the following reference: Memoirs, VI, 177-80.  November 7, 1823.  Italics 
inserted. 
60 Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State:  The American Encounter with the World 
Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Books, 1997), p. 5. 
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the former view nearly irreconcilable with a responsible national strategy.   Although 
examples of highly conservative and relatively isolationist administrations such as that of 
Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929) can be cited,61 the twentieth century was defined by 
American actions which, while arguably undertaken in the nation’s best interest in 
security and economic terms, have often been overtly justified through Wilsonian appeals 
to altruistic idealism and the philanthropic distribution of democratic governance.  
Historian David Kennedy asserts that every president since Wilson has “embraced the 
core principles of Wilsonianism.”62  
Indeed, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” to George H.W. 
Bush’s “New World Order” the Presidential justifications for U.S. intervention 
throughout the twentieth century always echoed the lofty goals of President Wilson’s 
Kantian ideal.  For decades, the Soviet threat provided the essential bulwark against 
which to legitimize the interweaving of mutually supporting strands of realism and 
idealism in U.S. foreign policy.  American security was, in fact, intricately interwoven 
with the fate of nations in both Europe and the Far East; for in the end, as only one 
ideology could ultimately emerge victorious, each “free” nation hanging precariously in 
the balance between the two competing ideologies was of vital importance.   Thus, at the 
height of Soviet power, President John F. Kennedy could legitimately hold forth his 
inaugural pronouncement.  “Let every nation know,” he promised, “whether it wishes us 
well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”63   At face value, 
the statement is an altruistic blank check to the world.  Yet, it was an encroaching and 
malevolent Soviet threat that credibly linked post-Wilson idealism such as Kennedy’s 
“success of liberty” with Adams’s independent “American system” across two centuries 
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business,” President Coolidge is noted for his reticence to engage America in foreign affairs and thus stands 
as the antithesis of modern internationalism.  
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of foreign policy.  In other words, the defense of democracy had come to demand 
engagement.  The isolationist prescription was no longer pertinent.  
Within a generation after President Kennedy, though, the Cold War had come to 
an abrupt end.  Thus, it was assumed that the diminished ideological threat would bring 
about a definitive change in American foreign policy.  With no competing worldview, 
America could “tend to its own garden.”  Shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
Patrick Buchanan, an advisor to President Reagan, summed up his hopeful expectations 
of the coming draw back of American presence abroad.  “The compensating concession 
we should offer [to Russia is]: total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe.  If Moscow 
will get out, we will get out.  Once the Red Army goes home, the reason for keeping a 
U.S. army in Europe vanishes.  Forty years after the Marshall Plan, it is time Europe 
conscripted the soldiers for its own defense.”64  Indeed, a renewed American reticence to 
engage in idealism-inspired military action began to emerge in the context of crises from 
the Balkans to Rwanda.   
One of the most famous statements in the lead up to the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia in 1991 was made by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.  Upon his return 
from the region he discouraged American intervention in what was seen as a “European” 
conflict and told President George H.W. Bush that “We don’t have a dog in this fight.” 65  
The restrictions on operations in the former Yugoslavia illustrated the limited degree of 
U.S. and allied commitment as well as American reticence to engage in costly fighting 
for the sake of ideological concerns.  In 1999, in the planning for Operation Allied Force, 
the insertion of ground forces was taken immediately out of consideration in fear of 
excessive military casualties.  Additionally, during the 78-day strategic bombing 
campaign, most aircraft sorties were kept above 15,000 feet to avoid potential U.S. and 
Allied casualties.  Considerable criticism has been directed against the Clinton 
administration’s response to human rights abuses in Rwanda.  Though considerable 
warning had been provided by intelligence sources regarding the impending genocide, the 
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Clinton administration, no doubt mindful of U.S. casualties suffered in Somalia less than 
a year earlier, decided not to act to stop the killing of 800,000 Hutus and Tutsis. 
An example of this changing tide of American idealism can be seen ten years after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the debates of the 2000 Presidential elections.   
Ironically, the leading voice opposing Wilsonian internationalism was George W. Bush.  
In his second debate with Vice President Al Gore, the Governor of Texas commented, “I 
think one way for us to end up being viewed as the ugly American is for us to go around 
the world saying, we do it this way, so should you…the United States must be 
humble…humble in how we treat nations that are figuring out how to chart their own 
course.”66  In response to a later question as to whether American troops should be 
involved in attempts at nation building around the world Governor Bush responded, “I 
don't think so. I think what we need to do is convince people who live in the lands they 
live in to build the nations. Maybe I'm missing something here. I mean, we're going to 
have kind of a nation building core from America? Absolutely not.”67  
These sentiments were consistent with a widespread loss of confidence in the 
prudence of American liberal internationalism.  While it might be pointed out that the 
year 2000 marked more than a half-century of democratic peace in Western Europe, the 
future President’s statements reflected a broad concern in U.S. society about the 
damaging consequences of American-led ideological crusades.  Indeed, the beginning of 
the Presidency of George W. Bush was characterized by unilateral decision making and 
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“America First” policies.68  While this unilateralism would not quickly fade, the Adams-
esque isolationist tendencies saw their waning moments in the smoldering fires of the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.  In point of fact, the attack on America inspired a 
new Wilsonian crusade.  David M. Kennedy notes, “Wilson’s ideas continue to dominate 
American foreign policy in the twenty-first century.  In the aftermath of 9/11, they have, 
if anything, taken on even greater vitality.”69  Though the U.S.-led invasion of 
Afghanistan in October 2001 evinced a realist-styled response, the administration would 
quickly revive the idealism of the previous century.  In the end, given the absence of 
weapons of mass destruction, Wilsonian idealism is the only professed justification of the 
administration’s intervention in Iraq still left standing.     
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE BUSH DEMOCRATIZATION STRATEGY 
An examination of the presidency of George W. Bush might identify two distinct 
and fundamental shifts that occurred in its policies regarding democratization and nation-
building.  The first of these two shifts took place as a direct reaction to what will 
undoubtedly be considered one of the defining events in U.S. history, the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001.  The second, and perhaps more subtle shift, took place at the point 
of the administration’s collective recognition of the absence of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq, the identified casus belli for the U.S. invasion.   
However, though the subtlety of this second shift might be mistaken for the oft-
occurring manipulation of foreign policy rhetoric, it is far more noteworthy than an 
adjustment in declaratory policy.  The reality of this apparent miscalculation has forced a 
realignment of national purpose and the emergence of a foreign policy strategy more 
exclusively dominated by Wilsonian ideals of global democratization than was the case 
prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  This strategy appears starkly 
antithetical to the administration’s initial identified goals and is significantly at variance 
with certain expectations of post-Cold War American retrenchment.    
This chapter analyzes these two pivotal points in the development of the national 
strategy.  It reviews the Bush administration’s transition from an initial phase of 
relatively Adams-esque caution about nation-building and “America-First” policies, with 
expectations of capitalizing upon the post-Cold War peace dividend, to a default strategy 
of bold idealism.  In the end, despite initial open skepticism regarding the prudence of 
Wilsonian internationalism, the current Bush administration policy – at this writing in 
September 2008 – reflects a strategy that is perhaps more Wilsonian than that of even 
Woodrow Wilson himself.    
Realist E.H. Carr wrote, “Politics are made up of two elements – utopia and 
reality – belonging to two different planes which can never meet.  Every political 
situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, or morality and 
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power.”70 While the history of American foreign policy is rife with rhetorical assent to 
both elements, possibly no era has more clearly demonstrated the tension between them 
than our own.   
The beginning of the presidency of George W. Bush in 2001 might be 
characterized as a period of relative restraint in which the President attempted to fulfill 
his commitment to a “humble” foreign policy that was, while not indifferent to the rest of 
the world, crafted with deference to “nations that are figuring out how to chart their own 
course.”71   Indeed, in contrast with the preceding administration, which had courted 
favor abroad by signing various international protocols such as the Rome Protocol for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the 
George W. Bush administration evinced a different attitude towards such foreign 
interaction.  Instead, often characterized and even criticized for what was seen as relative 
isolationism and unilateralism,72 President Bush’s administration immediately struck a 
tone different from that of his predecessor.  The president’s open opposition to new 
conventions such as the Kyoto Protocol, the landmine treaty and the International 
Criminal Court, as well as long-standing regimes such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, reflected a diminished confidence in the prudence of reliance on binding 
international agreements and a stark realism which placed the well being of the United 
States far above well-intentioned hopes in an idealized global harmony.   
Walter A. McDougall noted that the administration’s response to such issues had 
created a growing concern among allies across the Atlantic.  McDougall wrote, “To 
Europeans it seemed that post-Cold War America was reverting to a go-it-alone, cowboy 
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diplomacy that placed power and growth above humane global values.”73  The newly 
elected President Bush became both the emblematic symbol of this European perception 
as well as the lightning rod for related criticism.   
A June 2001 editorial in the Hamburg-based liberal magazine, Der Speigel, 
accurately represented the widespread opinion among European news sources and 
cultural elites.  The article entitled “Estranged Friends” proclaimed that "The United 
States and Europe have nothing much in common."  Shortly thereafter the magazine ran a 
story by Carlos Widmann, who wrote, "Until last week, Europe, from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, was for George W. Bush a white spot on the map…[which he called] 'Yurp.'”74  
However, regardless of the validity of the accusations, a clear and undeniable 
reversal of this perceived trend towards greater U.S. isolationism was forthcoming.  The 
attack on America on 11 September 2001 drastically forced the administration’s attention 
abroad and laid the foundation for an eventual idealist cause which, in conjunction with 
realist arguments, would justify an invasion of Iraq and the promotion of a bold quest to 
democratize the Middle East.     
A. THE RISE OF WILSONIAN IDEALISM IN THE BUSH STRATEGY 
In an address at the American Enterprise Institute in February 2003, the President 
himself noted the profound reorientation of thought which the events of 11 September 2001 
had inspired.  Acknowledging what he considered “a crucial period in the history of our 
nation, and of the civilized world,” he implored his audience to realize that “[a]s a result [of 
the terror attacks of September 11th] … we must look at security in a new way.”75  Though 
this “new way” was not yet clearly defined, the harbingers of this revised ideological 
orientation could be seen in the comments of some of the President’s closest advisors.   
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As early as 2000, future Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had criticized the 
management of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.  She deplored the fact 
that, “every issue [was] taken on its own terms -- crisis by crisis, day by day.” 76  Rice’s 
observations were well-founded.  The demise of the Soviet Union had removed a 
powerful twentieth century source of ideological conflict.  Since 1991, although the use 
of American military power was always justified as being intended to counter malevolent 
aggressors, these efforts were not undertaken as part of a consistent ideological design 
but instead as a series of responses to specific contingencies.  The 1990-1991 campaign 
against the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait stands as an effective example of this policy 
disposition.   
The successful ousting of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait was not justified as an 
action to confront a burgeoning malevolent ideology, but instead, as a necessary effort to 
uphold international law, repel a tyrant, and maintain stability in the region.  On 16 
January 1991, President George H. W. Bush informed the American people of the 
commencement of the actions in Kuwait as follows:  
Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The 
legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and 
Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all 
relevant United Nations resolutions, and then, when peace is restored, it is 
our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the 
family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf.77 
The swift defeat of the Iraqi forces and the liberation of Kuwait followed.  
However, the decision not to pursue a full invasion of Iraq was a clear indication of the 
limited and realist orientation of the operation as well as of the administration’s restraint. 
Notably, similar realism can also be seen in the remarks by President George W. 
Bush on the day of the terrorist attacks in America.  The President announced to the 
American people that  
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The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've 
directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement 
communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We 
will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts 
and those who harbor them.78  
As with his father’s admonition just over a decade before, President Bush’s 
commitment spoke of constrained goals to find and destroy the perpetrators of clear and 
undeniable aggression.   Indeed, four days later, the President seemed to reiterate this 
perspective when he promised a targeted effort of overwhelming force “in a series of 
decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support 
them.”79  However, it soon would become apparent that a momentous shift had taken 
place in the administration’s approach to foreign affairs and national security.  Michael 
Gerson, one of the President’s speech writers, acknowledged, “After the shock of 9/11, 
the Republican Party – the party of realism and caution – had become the party of 
idealism, action, and risk.”80   
In a critique of the nation’s post-Cold War strategy, Condoleezza Rice had stated 
in 2000, “The United States has found it exceedingly difficult to define its ‘national 
interest.’”81    However, during the months after the terrorist attacks, this would all 
change.    The president’s “new way” of looking at security involved a transition from the 
reactive pragmatism of the 1990s to an ideological campaign featuring a Wilsonian 
rhetoric that had appeared to be distinctly less convincing to U.S. policy-makers in the 
years immediately following the end of the Cold War.     
The terrorist attacks had heightened national awareness of the threat and 
prompted a realist-inspired U.S. –led coalition invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling 
of the Taliban regime.  However, as more information became known, the administration 
was faced with the undeniable reality that radical Islamic fundamentalism was not 
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confined to the desolate regions of Afghanistan.  Indeed, not one of the terrorist hijackers 
was from Afghanistan, and most of them were from Saudi Arabia.  The common link 
uniting these men was their association with non-state ideological terror networks, intent 
on doing harm to the Western world and making a bold, critical statement against its 
liberal values.  Furthermore, the potential for such radicals to gain access to weapons of 
mass destruction seemed to signal to the Bush administration the need for a broader scope 
to American engagement overseas.    
B. THE LOOMING THREAT AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE  
In perhaps his most famous speech – that in which he asked for a Congressional 
declaration of war against the Imperial German Government – President Woodrow Wilson 
visualized the world at a historic crossroads with “civilization itself seemingly in the 
balance.”82  Unrestricted submarine warfare had not created a new international paradigm, 
but instead had confirmed for the President the dire need for one.  The new international 
order he foresaw would usher in a lasting peace.   As previously noted, President George W. 
Bush also spoke of the “new world we have entered.” 83   However, his was not a Wilsonian 
vision of a democratic peace.  Instead, the president envisioned a highly dangerous world of 
burgeoning threats whose destructive potential had been exacerbated by the convergence of 
“radicalism and technology.”84    The President warned of “shadowy networks of individuals 
[which] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores.”85  In effect, the clearest 
manifestation of this new era had occurred on 11 September 2001.   
During the Cold War, risk-aversion on both sides of the East-West ideological 
stalemate helped to contain outright aggression.  However, the Bush administration 
identified three distinct differences in the new global threat environment.  First, due to 
their religious glorification of personal sacrifice, the terrorists attacking the United States 
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and other Western countries were recognized as largely impervious to deterrence by 
threat of punishment.  Second, the attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that the 
threats in the current age were far more immediate.  Lastly, technological sophistication 
could put the great destructive potential of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the 
hands of regional powers and non-state actors.  These actors, unable to compete in the 
conventional military arena, seemed intent on intimidation, blackmail and the 
psychological victory of wounding a more powerful opponent.    
The 2002 National Security Strategy identified this imbalance and even 
considered it a justification for a reconsideration of the historical limitations on 
“preemptive” war. As the strategy pointed out, the legitimacy of preemption has been 
largely based on the existence of an “imminent threat.”  However, as the threat was no 
longer a presumed invasion but unforeseeable acts of significant societal devastation, no 
“visible mobilization of armies, navies and air forces preparing to attack” could be 
expected.86  Weapons “easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning” 
could create an enormous potential for massive civilian losses.87  To the Bush 
administration, this recognized inability to distinguish the imminence of a threat 
discredited the existing definition of the requirements for legitimate preemptive action.   
The administration began to assert a growing commitment to bold action:  “To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.”88  Many observers have argued that this strategy clearly 
constituted a more “proactive” approach to combating threats or, as Gerson notes, one 
which could be characterized by increased “action” and “risk.”   
Yet, the new strategy began to materialize in many ways, largely reminiscent of 
the ideological confrontation of the previous century.  Just as Soviet nuclear armament 
and an aggressive communist ideology had tightly woven American security with U.S. 
support of anti-communist liberalism around the world, the potential coupling of militant 
                                                 




Islamic fundamentalists and sympathetic nuclear-capable autocracies instigated the Bush 
administration’s development of a similar bi-nodal strategy composed of elements of 
realism and idealism.  
In addition to supporting increased preparedness for action, the administration 
also began to widen the scope of the American response to the emerging threat.  In the 
State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush spoke first of realist 
objectives. He warned potential aggressors that should they decide to act against 
America, they “will not escape the justice of this nation.”89  He said that the U.S. Armed 
Forces would “shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to 
justice.”   Yet then, in what has become one of his most famous pronouncements, the 
President broadened the “War on Terror” by signaling that the campaign would widen 
from a hunt for non-state aggressors to include recognized state entities.  He then 
famously identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “an axis of evil…[that could] threaten 
the peace of the world.” 90   Only two months before he had told the world that nations 
would have to make a choice. “You are either with us or you are against us,” he 
announced.91   Though at that time he said that he had “no specific nation in mind,” by 
January 2002, he had clearly made up his mind and was prepared to name the states 
forming what he called “an axis of evil.”  
This “axis of evil” formulation had two distinct effects.  First, it directly 
threatened those regimes which remained a continuing menace to U.S. security.  More 
importantly, however, it created the foundation for a clear and consistent national strategy 
which, Condoleezza Rice had noted, had been sorely lacking.  Through the President’s 
address, Iraq, Iran and North Korea had become adversaries in an idealized confrontation.  
These countries were perceived as threats, owing in part to their evident nuclear ambitions.  
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All were non-liberal regimes, hostile to Western democratic ideals, and this characteristic 
was a dominating factor in the President’s strategy henceforth.  
The overt Wilsonian idealism of the new national strategy would became more 
pronounced in a speech delivered by President Bush at West Point in June 2002.  In remarks 
which now seem prophetic, the president spoke of former graduates, commissioned during 
the Second World War, who had helped in “defeating Japan and Germany, and then 
reconstructing those nations as allies.”  As with those former cadets  who had graduated over 
50 years earlier, these new officers could look forward to the possibility that as the “the sun 
set on their struggle,” they might also live “to see a world transformed.”92  Clearly, that 
which had once been cast as a mission to hunt down and eliminate terrorists was being firmly 
grafted to a Wilsonian vision of global pacification in a “world…made fit and safe to live 
in.”93  “Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense,” the President 
reminded the graduates.  “We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace -- a peace that favors 
human liberty. We will defend the peace.”94 
The President’s closing words echoed the sentiments of the nation’s 28th President.  
In calling the nation to war in Europe, Wilson had told Congress that America’s citizens 
“must dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we 
have…for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has 
treasured.  God helping her, she can do no other.”95   Less than a century later, President 
Bush implored Americans to fulfill this same timeless obligation. “Building this just peace,” 
the President said, “is America's opportunity, and America's duty.”96 
By the conclusion of the President’s June 2002 address to the cadets, it was 
apparent that the realism in the American strategic calculus had been closely matched by 
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a growing idealistic cause.  Presenting a Manichean vision of the world stage, the 
president told his listeners and the nation that “We are in a conflict between good and 
evil.”  Furthermore, he stated that the U.S. military’s and the nation’s objectives were in 
fact more ambitious than the current engagement to bring the perpetrators of terrorism to 
justice.   Instead, the President implored the cadets to remember that “America has a 
greater objective than controlling threats and containing resentment.  We will work for a 
just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.”97 
The National Security Strategy published in September 2002 reinforced this 
depiction of the administration’s strategy. Like his predecessors, President Bush made it 
immediately clear that the security of the American people was the highest priority of his 
administration.  The President reiterated his commitment to this task: “Defending our 
Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal 
Government.”98   In the most basic sense, this defense is certainly poised against those 
who seek to do America harm.  However, the President’s notion of defense clearly 
encompassed more than simply protection against physical harm.  “Freedom,” he stated, 
is “the birthright of every person.” Moreover, he declared, “These values of freedom are 
right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values 
against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe 
and across the ages.”99   
While the defense of Americans and their values would likely meet minimal 
principled objection, the “proactive” pursuit of this national “cause” has historically 
defined the difference between realism and idealism in American foreign policy.  The 
universal extension of the aforementioned American “values of freedom,” while perhaps 
ideologically philanthropic, has nevertheless often seemed both incompatible with the 
values of many societies around the world and, furthermore, too large a task for the 
commitment of American blood and treasure.  Yet, the marriage of this ideological 
altruism with national security began to dominate American foreign policy decisions after 
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11 September 2001.  Dubbed “a distinctly American internationalism” by the President, 
this approach to national security, he asserted, would “reflects the union of our values and 
our national interests.”100  In the President’s discourse, “the safety of America and the 
peace of the planet” 101 were joined under the threat from “the axis of evil.”  
C. THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE SPEECH AND THE 
INVASION OF IRAQ  
On 26 February 2003, the President spoke at the American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI).  He presented what might be considered the administration’s clearest justification 
of the action which it was prepared to take in Iraq and the first step in the new, more  
proactive, security strategy.  The consistency of the President’s justification with the 
strategic vision which had developed in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 
are quite clear.  However, the speech at the AEI is particularly informative.  Delivered 
less than a month before combat operations in Iraq began, the speech represents the 
administration’s most refined vision of the policy which was about to be implemented by 
force.   
The President began with reference to the universal scope of the strategy, noting 
the “crucial period in the history of our nation, and the civilized world.”102  He then made 
the case for U.S. action specifically against the Iraqi regime, led by a dictator who is 
“building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East and 
intimidate the civilized world.”103   The President urged action against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, to eliminate a tyrant with “close ties to terrorist organizations” who “could 
supply them with the terrible means to strike this country.”104   This realism-inspired 
justification for invasion depicted American efforts as “opposing the greatest danger in 
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the war on terror: outlaw regimes arming terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.”105  
The President then assured his audience that “[t]he safety of the American people 
depends on ending this direct and growing threat.”106   In this statement, America was 
provided undeniable proof that the coming effort in Iraq had American security as its 
bedrock intention.   
There are two additional important references made by the President in this 
speech which reveal much about the administration’s pre-war disposition.  First, it is 
noteworthy that, regarding Iraq’s political future, the President remained conspicuously 
impartial, stating that “[t]he United States has no intention of determining the precise 
form of Iraq’s new government.”107  Secondly, in justifying America’s imminent use of 
force, the President held forth a clear and concise depiction of his administration’s 
ongoing strategy: “American interests in security, and America’s belief in liberty, both 
lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.”108  Iraq was thus depicted as both 
a realist threat and an idealistic beachhead in the global advance of democracy.  In the 
aftermath of the invasion, as evidence of the allegedly imminent Iraqi WMD threat never 
materialized, only one of these tenets would remain politically viable.    
D. REVISING THE JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. ACTION IN VIEW OF THE 
ABSENCE OF WMD 
A substantial setback in the Bush administration’s strategy began to emerge 
within only a few months of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Though the operation had 
been justified as an effort to eliminate a regime which threatened the United States and 
the world with weapons of mass destruction, the search for these weapons was 
unsuccessful.  A tacit acknowledgement of the futility of the search was apparent.  
Indeed, in a highly criticized skit at the Radio and Television Correspondents Association 
on 23 March 2004, President Bush was shown desperately searching the oval office for 
                                                 





the undiscovered weapons of mass destruction.  Though intended as self-effacing humor, 
the ill-advised gaffe and the resulting criticism reflected a growing exasperation in both 
the administration and the American people, who had expected to find substantive 
justification for this first major military intervention under the newly identified security 
strategy.109  
The absence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was an undeniable crushing 
blow to the new strategy.  Regardless of the Iraqi leader’s malevolence, without WMD or 
evidence of a continuing concerted effort at their development and production, Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq did not meet the President’s standard for “regimes who seek chemical, 
biological or nuclear weapons” with a view to “threatening the United States and the 
world.”110  As a result, it became increasingly clear that the United States had, though 
perhaps unintentionally, unmistakably commenced upon a path of regime change, 
democratization, and nation-building in the name of democratic peace – precisely the 
character of U.S. entanglement President Bush had once deplored.   
E. THE APOGEE OF WILSONIAN IDEALISM: THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF MARCH 2006 
 
The 2002 National Security Strategy had reflected a heightened national 
awareness of the threat to domestic security, and maintained some of the characteristic 
realism typified in “balance of power” politics. Failure to find the alleged WMD in Iraq, 
however, had a distinctive effect on the maintenance of this strategy.  The realism-
inspired justification also provided in the AEI speech before the invasion of Iraq had 
become largely obsolete, irrelevant, and even embarrassing.  In fact, the absence of 
WMD in Iraq stood out as a momentous U.S. intelligence failure.111    
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In turn, a marked shift occurred towards a significantly more idealistic approach 
to U.S. foreign policy.  In the absence of Iraqi WMD, the justification for the continued 
U.S. presence in Iraq significantly changed.  The “security of the American people” was, 
in effect, displaced by “a united, stable, and democratic Iraq.”112   Indeed, idealism is the 
most evident tone of the 2006 National Security Strategy.  The new strategy reflects an 
idealistic justification for the exertion of U.S. power around the world.  With its initial 
success in Afghanistan threatened and a diminishing validation for action in Iraq, the 
administration refined the strategy and set forth a security vision in which the dominant 
priority had clearly shifted toward philanthropic altruism.  Though the administration 
maintained that the effort to  “defend our [American] liberty and …our [American] 
lives”113  was irrevocably linked to “confronting evil and lawless regimes,” the 
dominating theme of the new security strategy was a proclivity to commit American 
might to actualize a Wilsonian vision of “a just and peaceful world.”114   
In his introductory letter to the 2006 National Security Strategy the President 
noted that America’s “most solemn obligation” is “to protect the security of the American 
people,” but such sentiments were quickly eclipsed by grander objectives.115  The 
strategy even stated that the “ultimate goal” of U.S. policy is “ending tyranny in our 
world.”116  Thus, policy realism was in essence placed on par with liberalism as the 
President asserted that, in seeking a peaceful distribution of power, “[t]he goal of our 
statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states.”117  The change is 
noteworthy.  While the U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated America’s willingness to 
engage in preventive war in the face of a perceived threat, the 2006 National Security 
Strategy appeared to call for continued U.S. intervention for the purpose of realizing an 
ambitious vision of world peace.    
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In the absence of a traditional realist cause the Bush administration developed a 
long-term strategy to protect Americans which clearly found its strongest roots in the 
liberal internationalist tradition.  “Democratization” might rightly be considered the Bush 
administration’s ultimate justification for the use of force.  The President’s goal was to 
make Americans more secure by ensuring the global spread of a democratic peace.   The 
President clearly stated in the 2006 NSS that “the advance of liberty will make America 
more secure.”118  In effect, the administration chose to rely largely on the principles of 
President Wilson’s idealistic vision to ensure American security.   
F. A STRATEGY OF REVOLUTIONISM  
British historian Martin Wight provided an enlightening analytical framework by 
which to evaluate the character of the transition that U.S. security strategy has undergone 
since the beginning of the George W. Bush administration.  In his book entitled 
International Theory: The Three Traditions, Wight characterized the leading traditions in 
the history of Western thinking about international relations.  Realists, whose views 
Wight described as Machiavellian, subscribe to a vision of international politics as “those 
who emphasize and concentrate upon the element of international anarchy” – that is,  “ a 
multiplicity of independent sovereign states acknowledging no political superior, whose 
relationships are ultimately regulated by warfare.”119  Wight added, “The common 
assertion of all these [Realist] writers…is that really there is no such thing as 
international society, and the evidence for its existence does not bear examination.”120 
The second tradition identified by Wight, called the Grotian or Rationalist view, is 
the outlook of “those who concentrate on, and believe in the value of, the element of 
international intercourse in a condition predominantly of international anarchy.”121  The 
question, according to Rationalists, regarding the nature of international society “posits 
that in the state of nature men are still bound by the law of nature.”  Thus, “[s]overeignty 
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had indeed passed to different states, by social contracts, but the original unity of the human 
race survived; there was a law of nations acknowledged by sovereigns, even if violated, and 
this was the original natural law, which was legally binding and not just a moral 
imperative.”122 
The final tradition in Wight’s analysis is that of the Revolutionist or Kantian view.  
Kantians “are those who emphasize and concentrate upon the element of the society of states, 
or international society.”123 Kantians reject both the Machiavellian view as well as the 
Grotian view.  They are “defined more precisely as those who believe so passionately in the 
moral unity of the society of states or international society, that they identify themselves with 
it, and therefore they both claim to speak in the name of this unity, and experience an 
overriding obligation to give effect to it, as the first aim of their international policies.  For 
them, the whole of international society transcends its parts.”124  
In the foreward to Martin Wight’s work, International Theory: The Three Traditions, 
Adam Roberts admitted that there exist significant “objections to the idea of forcing all the 
rich complexity of thought about international relations into three pigeon holes.”125  He 
noted that Wight held that these “three traditions should be seen, not as pigeon-holes or 
labels,  but rather as strands, or primary colours, which are intermixed in endless different 
ways by different practitioners and writers.”126 
Thus, a fair assessment of the security strategy of the George W. Bush administration 
does not result in  a stark compartmentalization of the ideas within one or another of the 
traditions identified by Wight, but instead shows the dominance among these differing 
“strands, or primary colours” of the Kantian or Revolutionist tradition.  The transition in the 
George W. Bush administration’s policy has proceeded, due in part to significant historical 
events, from a disposition in which the Machiavellian or Realist view was the dominant 
“strand” to one in which the Kantian view has risen to preeminence.   
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As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, American foreign policy has always 
included elements of the Kantian view, with Woodrow Wilson’s presidency recognized 
as the superlative example and effective commencement for its dominance in modern 
U.S. foreign policy.  However, it can be argued that since early 2003, the Bush 
administration’s rhetorical justification for American involvement abroad, particularly in 
the Middle East, has been, through the course of events, significantly depleted of realist 
elements and has become dominated instead by an idealism that has surpassed that of 
even the Wilson administration. 
President Wilson defended his decision to commit U.S. forces in the European 
conflict with significant appeals to idealistic notions of “the vindication of right, of 
human right.”127   However, there exist significant Grotian, or rationalist, overtones in his 
vision of post-conflict peace and his preoccupation with international law.  Wilson’s 
compromises in the peace negotiations also illustrate his willingness to make deals falling 
short of his preferred principles.   
President Bush, however, has shown less pragmatism than Wilson in his foreign-
policy decision making.  Respect for national sovereignty in its historic understanding 
has been subjugated to certain ideals perceived as universal and nonnegotiable.  In 
President Bush’s words, “These nonnegotiable demands of human dignity [liberty and 
justice] are protected most securely in democracies.”128  In addition, democracy and the 
democratic values of Western countries have been described as innate demands of all of 
humanity whose global establishment is inevitable and, in large measure, the 
responsibility of the United States and the rest of the free world.    While the President 
announced at West Point that “The requirements of freedom apply fully to…the entire 
Islamic world,”129 such a comment could have been understood merely as an expression 
of America’s longstanding sympathy for people suffering under oppressive regimes.  
However, as Wight noted in a passage previously cited, the Revolutionists can be defined 
as “those who believe so passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or 
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international society that they identify themselves with it and therefore they claim to 
speak in the name of this unity and experience an overriding obligation to give effect to 
it.”130   
Wight provides a fuller description of this perspective as well.  He writes that the 
Revolutionist “assertion that international society is a civitas maxima, a super-state (and 
‘is’ here means ‘is essentially,’ ‘ought to be’ or ‘is destined to be’), raises at once the 
question of conformity and non-conformity.  What is to be done about the citizens of the 
civitas maxima, i.e., states, which reject its authority in principle or counteract it in 
practice?”  Wight provides one answer given in the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579) 
“which deduced from the unity of human society the right of intervention to protect the 
oppressed.   This is an early statement of the Revolutionist idea that horizontal ties are 
more important than, and may override, vertical ties.” 131   Evidence of such views has 
become undeniably predominant in the Bush administration’s discourse, including the 
2006 National Security Strategy.  
The burgeoning dominance of this new Revolutionist view appeared in the 
President’s State of the Union Address in January 2006. President Bush informed 
America that “We're making progress in the march of freedom, and some of the most 
important progress is taking place in a region that has not known the blessings of liberty, 
the broader Middle East.”132  These comments presume that it is a distinct mission of the 
United States to initiate and oversee a worldwide democratic conversion.  While in 
November 2003 the President had depicted the democratization of Iraq as “a watershed 
event in the global democratic revolution,”133 his State of the Union message revealed 
the administration’s conviction as to the American obligation to carry forward that 
ideological revolution.  The President promised, “our nation is committed to an historic, 
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long-term goal — we seek the end of tyranny in our world.”134  The missionary character 
that Wight’s analysis attributed to Revolutionists seemed indeed to have taken command 
of the Bush administration’s outlook. 
It is this missionary spirit which now sustains the U.S. effort in Iraq.  Indeed, for 
many it has become the sole remaining source of conviction for continued sacrifice.  
However, like all strategies this Revolutionist idealism is not without considerable 
vulnerabilities.   Indeed, regardless of whether the U.S. invasion of Iraq has ultimately 
strengthened American security or not, it is only the installation of a stable democracy in 
Iraq which will redeem the administration’s vision and justify coalition sacrifices.  
However noble in its ideals, the success of this strategy will be seen through the lens of 
time.   Thus it is important to identify the inherent obstacles which stand in the way of the 
eventual success of this ambitious strategy.  The following chapter focuses on the 
obstacles to the fulfillment of the Kantian and Wilsonian vision which has come to 
dominate U.S. democratization strategy. 
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IV. OBSTACLES TO A DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
The lack of definitive proof of the imminence of Saddam Hussein’s alleged threat 
to America – the theory that (a) he had illegally produced WMD and (b) was prepared to 
transfer them to terrorist groups – has radically altered the character of U.S. security 
strategy since the invasion of Iraq.  The strategy, seemingly now based entirely on U.S. 
leadership in promoting “democratization,” finds its sole foundation in the Kantian 
expectations of liberal governance.  However, the success of this strategy is largely 
dependent on three premises:  (1) the cogency of democratic peace theory; (2) the 
realization of positive societal changes through democracy; and (3) the successful 
alignment of Western democratic and liberal values with the ideological proclivities of 
the targeted regime and/or society.   Impediments to the success of the Bush 
administration’s democratization strategy can be identified within each of these three 
categorical demarcations.   It is important to recognize and examine these potential fault 
lines in the strategy in order to ensure the optimal selection of target regimes for potential 
democratization and, ultimately, to evaluate the prudence of broadening the strategy’s 
current implementation.    
A. DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
Though significant empirical evidence, as noted in Chapter II, seems to support 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of achievable perpetual peace, the pacifying effects of 
democracy on interstate interaction are not without considerable limitations and have 
proven to be far less of a guarantee of overall peace than some analysts and political 
leaders have maintained.  In fact, critical examinations of the causal logic in the theory 
have discovered significant shortcomings in the hypothesis that “common norms of live-
and-let-live and domestic institutions … constrain the recourse to war.”135 A growing 
body of evidence suggests that, although there may be a significant correlation between 
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dyadic democratic co-existence, the two variables may be only minimally related or, in 
fact, democracy may not be a causal factor at all.   
One objection to democratic peace theory points out that other phenomena, aside 
from a set of countries’ liberal regimes, may account for their peaceful co-existence.  
Sebastian Rosato observed that “the democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II 
phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe,” and suggests that the 
apparent democratic peace during this time period is a result of the fact that “the United 
States has been the dominant power in both these regions since World War II and has 
[successfully] placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace.”136 Rosato’s analysis 
reviewed “all pairs of democracies directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or 
separated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and 1990.”137  During that time 
period, he found that there were a total of 2,427 double democratic dyads.  Within this 
field he determined that 90% of these double democratic dyads were “confined to two 
geographic regions, the Americas and Western Europe.”138   
From this evidence, a reasonable conclusion might be drawn which asserts that 
the lasting peace among democracies might be in fact causally related to the dominance 
of American power and influence in the two regions.  “American preponderance has 
underpinned, and continues to underpin stability and peace in both of these regions.  In 
the Americas the United States has successfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of 
driving out the European colonial powers and selectively intervening either to ensure that 
regional conflicts do not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or to install 
regimes that are sympathetic to its interests.”139   
Similarly, in Europe, American influence has had a profound effect on the 
maintenance of peace between democratic states.  Rosato contended that “the experience 
of both World Wars persuaded American policymakers that U.S. interests lay in 
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preventing the continent [from] ever returning to the security competition that had 
plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars.”  He further noted that U.S. initiatives such as “the 
Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, European integration, and the forward 
deployment of American troops on German soil should all be viewed from this 
perspective” and might account more fully for the lasting peace than democratic regimes.  
In summary, Rosato concluded, “the United States has been by far the most dominant 
state in both the Americas and Western Europe since World War II and has been 
committed, above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace.”140  In other words, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that U.S. military strength and credibility in upholding 
security commitments, and not only shared democratic ideals, help to account for the 
lasting peace between the democratic states predominantly concentrated in the Americas 
and Europe.141   
A second challenge to democratic peace theory has arisen from the observation 
that, historically, liberal states with representative governments have not consistently 
treated each other as the theory predicts.  In fact, many have actually been involved in 
armed conflict with each other.  In other words, the pacifying effects of Kant’s uniquely 
republican virtue of public constraint142 have not always materialized.  Skeptics as to the 
validity of the theory cite as refutation numerous conflicts between relatively liberal 
regimes extending from the U.S.-British War of 1812 to the Israel-Lebanon War in 
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2006.143  In response, democratic peace theorists have sought to narrow the definition of 
democracy, and thereby revalidate the hypothesis.   Such restrictive definitions of 
“democracy” are useful in the analysis of the U.S. democratization strategy in two ways.    
First, they establish a comparatively rigorous basis for the conclusions drawn on the 
statistical examinations of the theory.  Secondly, once identified, these qualifying 
characteristics of democracy provide a clear indication of the optimal regime 
characteristics which will likely lead to the desired end state – that is, a democratic peace.   
Innumerable attributes have been put forth to identify the nature of non-warring 
democracies.  Oft cited domestic characteristics include such elements as universal 
suffrage and the absence of corruption, bribery and voter fraud.  James Lee Ray, for 
instance, isolated three defining characteristics which qualify a state as a “stable” 
democracy and, in doing so, statistically confirmed the notion of a democratic peace 
between liberal regimes.  Ray’s characteristics of  “states …sufficiently democratic to 
avoid war” are as follows: 
 
1) “leaders are selected in a process based on fair, competitive elections,” and 
such elections are defined as “those in which at least two formally independent 
political parties (or other groups) present candidates,” 
2) “at least 50% of the adult population is allowed to vote,” and 
3) “the political system in question has produced at least one peaceful, 
constitutional transfer of executive power from one independent political party to 
another by means of an election.”144 
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The last characteristic is perhaps the most important for it identifies one of the 
largest obstacles to the success of the U.S. democratization strategy – sustainability over 
time.  In fact, it might be said that meeting the challenge of sustaining the liberal regime 
for an extended period is as important as the peaceful transfer of power.  Absent this 
minimal duration there appears to be a far lower probability of a democratically 
encouraged peace.  R.J. Rummel set this minimal associated duration at approximately 
three years.  Qualifying the correlation between liberal governance and the absence of 
war, Rummel underscored the necessity of “undoubted” or “well-established” 
democracies.  It is thus, according to Rummel, this democratic maturity which allows for 
“peace-sufficient democratic procedures to become accepted and democratic culture to 
settle in.”145   However, proponents of democratic peace theory make no promises for 
peaceful interaction between “democratizing” or “not yet fully democratic” states.  In 
fact, research indicates that it is in this initial phase of transition towards presumably  
“well-established” democratic status that democratizing states are most likely to become 
involved in conflict.  
Evidence of this apparent phenomenon is cited by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder. They found that “democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were 
states that had undergone no regime change.”146  Moreover, they concluded, “Based on 
the competitiveness of political participation, the probability that democratizing states 
would fight any type of war was, on average, about 75% greater than for states 
undergoing no regime change.”147  More notably, their research indicated that, “[t]he 
probability of interstate wars for countries in the process of democratization was, on 
average, about twice as large as for countries experiencing no regime change.”148 
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Additionally, regardless of the reality of the democratic norms within a country, it 
is has been asserted that an additional causal factor, that of perception, might greatly 
hinder (or enhance) peaceful interaction among states.  By this logic, “democracies will 
only trust and respect one another if they consider each other to be democratic.”149  The 
implications of this caveat are clear, particularly, as Rosato noted, when “policy makers’ 
personal beliefs and party affiliations, or strategic interest, often prelude coherent, 
accurate and stable assessments of regime type.”150  It is not merely the reality of the 
democratic character of a state, but potentially also the external perception of that state, 
which must be present to secure a democratic peace.  Correspondingly, confidence in the 
cogency of the idea that “joint democracy enables democracies to remain at peace”151 is 
distinctly lowered.  In other words, if the perception of a state’s democratic character is 
the decisive causal factor for a democratic peace, the true character of a regime may be 
irrelevant and non-causal; and the entire hypothesis could thus fail.  
A final challenge to democratic peace theory is the impact which limited 
resources and increasing demand between states would have on interstate peace.  John 
Baden, chairman of the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, 
noted that one historic exception constitutes a weakness in the theory.  “The exception 
that makes even established democracies take up arms against one another is fish.”152  
Baden cited disputes between Britain, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United States over fishing rights that often escalated into violence; and this violence 
sometimes involved naval gunfire. The reason he gave for why this issue had trumped the 
ideological congruence between these Western, liberal, democratic states was that “too 
many fishermen chase too few fish.”153  The obvious implication of this anomaly for the 
current U.S. democratization strategy in the Middle East is daunting.  In a region of 
limited, diminishing oil reserves and deep religious and sectarian divisions, whose 
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markets are threatened by growing initiatives for greater conservation measures and alternative 
energy sources in many countries, the peaceful avoidance of a local equivalent of Baden’s fishing 
scenario even among future Middle Eastern “democracies” seems implausible.  As Rosato has 
noted, “democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution, nor 
do they generally treat each other with trust and respect when their interests clash.”154 
Independent of any inherent weaknesses in the democratic peace hypothesis, U.S. 
democratization strategy faces significant challenges in the crucial phase of “installing” 
democracies in non-democratic regions in pursuit of the expected peace benefits.  Indeed, what 
Nils Petter Gleditsh, Lene Siljeholm Christiansen and Havard Hegre consider the “regional 
environment of the new democracies”155 is of capital importance and provides another 
formidable obstacle to the establishment of a democratic peace.  
In 1983, Michael Doyle observed that while “[l]iberalism does appear to disrupt the 
pursuit of balance-of-power politics,” it “is not inherently ‘peace-loving’; nor is it consistently 
restrained or peaceful in intent.”156    This apparent contradiction with Kant’s view that a free 
people would be cautious in “decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war”157 is explained 
through what Doyle identified as “the differences between liberal practice toward other liberal 
societies and liberal practice toward nonliberal societies.” 158  Doyle argued that while 
“liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in the first,” it has “contributed to exceptional 
confusion in the second.”159   Doyle highlighted the fact that “liberal states have become 
involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states.”160   
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These observations were empirically validated in a 1997 analysis conducted by 
Arvid Rakenrud and Havard Hegre.  This study concluded that between 1840 and 1992 
“dyads of two democracies had a 57% lower probability than mixed dyads of onset of 
interstate war.”161   Moreover, it was also estimated that these dyads had a 35% lower 
probability of resorting to war than non-democratic dyads. 162  Thus the dyads with the 
greatest risk of warfare were those which consisted of democratic and non-democratic 
states. 
Game theory methodology might provide some insight into one of the causes of 
this apparent phenomenon.  The loose application of Rousseau’s famous “stag hunt” 
theory163 can help to illustrate the possible effects of bias in states’ normal decision 
making processes as a result of the existence of a mixed dyadic relationship and the 
associated character preconceptions of both states.  The theory presumes that two states – 
like two men hunting for a stag – share an interest in a common good (peace) which 
could be attained through cooperation.  As neither can know for certain the willingness of 
the other to cooperate fully, each instead acts in its own narrow self interest (that is, in an 
uncooperative way) to minimize the risk of acting cooperatively or in a “non-aggressive” 
way on its own.  In Rousseau’s illustration, each hunter foregoes the stag and instead 
pursues an animal he is capable of catching on his own, a hare.  Extending this analogy 
into the realm of international relations, each state would thus forego the risks of non-
aggression and instead resort to aggression.  The diagram below illustrates the dynamic.  
In the illustration, it is assumed that arbitrary numerical values can be have been 
assigned to each of the possible outcomes of each state’s decision with ten being the best, 
8 as a secondary reward, 7 as a tertiary reward and obviously 0 the worst.  The numerical 
results of each combination are depicted as (State A, State B) in the matrices below.   
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Figure 1.   Stag hunt illustration (interstate relations). 
 
Representative governance was envisioned as one way to annul this inherent bias 
toward aggression among autocratic states as the public disinclination towards war would 
tend to push democratic states towards the (10, 10) outcome.  However, an examination 
of a mixed dyadic relationship returns less than optimal outcomes for enhanced stability.  
While similar to the above scenario, in that neither state can be exactly sure of the 
inclinations of the rival, the recognized character norms of each exert a bias into the 
decision making process.  Non-aggression by the non-democracy is mostly “risk-free.”  
However, aggression by the democracy is quickly seen as the only option not laden with 
risk.    The diagrams below illustrate the dynamic. 
Like the non-democratic state (A), the democratic state (B) has two choices: 
aggression or non-aggression.  Due to their relative transparency, their consensus-driven 
slowness to mobilize, and their expected inclination toward nonviolent conflict 
resolution, democratic states are perceived to have a proclivity towards non-aggression.  
Thus in the revised stag hunt matrix below, State A (non-democratic) would reasonably 
expect the actions of State B (democratic) to incline towards non-aggression (circled).  
This assumption provides State A minimal risk in non-aggression for by remaining non-
aggressive it achieves the highest possible outcome (10).  In fact, acting aggressively 













Figure 2.   Modified stag hunt (democratic bias) 
However, as Rosato noted, “non-democracies are neither trusted nor respected.  
They are not respected because their domestic systems are considered unjust, and they are 
not trusted because neither do they respect the freedom of self-governing individuals, nor 
are they socialized to resolve conflicts non-violently.”164  Thus State B (democratic) 
would reasonably expect State A (non-democratic) to incline towards aggression 
(circled).  This assumption leaves State B with an unacceptable risk from non-aggression 
which would deliver the worst possible outcome (0).  However, aggression would 
minimize the risk by resulting in a less than optimum but acceptable result (7). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Modified stag hunt (non-democratic bias) 
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In summary, in this modified “stag hunt” dynamic, the perceived democratic 
norms of State B have allowed State A to presume minimal risk through inaction.  
However, the perceived non-democratic norms of State A have made the risk to State B 
too high for non-aggression.  This illustration provides some indication for why, when in 
a mixed dyad relationship, democratic societies may have to defend themselves or even 
“launch preemptive strikes.”165   
This illustration of the effect of bias might shed some light on one of the 
underlying influences behind the 1981 attack by Israeli aircraft on the Iraqi Nuclear 
Materials Testing Reactor (Osirak) at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, 
southeast of Baghdad.  While Iraq would have likely been unconcerned about 
unprovoked Israeli aggression, owing to Israel’s democratic regime, for Israel, inaction in 
the face of potential nuclear arms development and utilization incurred far too high a risk 
to accept.     
Ultimately, the above illustration should provide some degree of skepticism as to 
the overall positive effect of establishing democratic states in a context with non-
democratic states.  At a minimum one might expect such an action could have 
unpredictable results.  However, in some circumstances, this mixed dyad relationship 
might actually increase the potential for hostility.  Though the ideal effects of global 
democratization are desirable in the long term, this potentially destabilizing dyadic 
relationship might ultimately undercut the fulfillment of the intended “league of peace.”  
Gleditsh, Christiansen and Hegre concluded, “The idea of remaking the Middle East into 
a haven of democracy may be laudable, but a piecemeal strategy does not seem to have 
much chance of success.”166  Additionally, while a full scale simultaneous conversion of 
all states in the region to democratic governance might create the desired zone of 
democratic peace, “Invading all of the autocratic countries in the region over a short 
period, does not seem very realistic either.  It would rob the West of most of its allies in 
the region and would inevitably lead to an imperial overstretch.”167   
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In summary, while growing acceptance of democratic peace theory might provide 
an explanation for President Bush’s assertion that “democracies don’t war,”168 various 
new analyses of causative factors suggest that peace may not be the inevitable outcome of 
democratization.  In relation to the qualifying precepts necessary for theoretical 
validation, democratic peace theory shows significant limitations which must be 
recognized as potential shortcomings in its overall cogency.  These limitations represent 
grave practical obstacles to the success of the current U.S. democratization strategy.  
Additionally, even if it could ultimately be concluded that democratic governance can 
ensure peace, the pursuit of such governance is laden with destabilizing effects which 
might – at least in some cases – compromise the achievement of the strategy’s ultimate 
goal and place American security at risk by promoting regional instability.  
B. EFFECTS OF DEMOCRATIZATION STRATEGY 
Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics, wrote, “Throughout 
the nineteenth century, theorists of democracy found it quite natural to discuss whether 
one country or another was ‘fit for democracy.’  This thinking changed only in the 
twentieth century, with the recognition that the question itself was wrong: A country does 
not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through 
democracy.”169   While Sen may indeed be correct, the challenges of making a country 
“fit through democracy” have become increasingly significant obstacles to the success of 
U.S. strategy.  In fact, the success of the strategy has become dependent in part upon the 
domestic impact of democracy itself.  Liberal polities have clearly generated significant 
improvements in living standards and freedom in the West.  However, democratic liberty, 
particularly when implemented through military intervention, has presented significant 
hindrances to peace.   
Much of the success of the current U.S. democratization strategy depends not on 
the initial destruction of oppressive or threatening regimes but instead on the design of an 
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effective exit strategy which will leave behind a peaceful and functioning regime.  In 
order to maintain indispensable international support, each operation will demand the 
successful establishment of stable governance in countries where the state, including 
whatever minimal support structure it provided, has been completely destroyed.  In fact, 
it is reasonable to assume as well that continued international support for U.S. military 
operations abroad, particularly when effecting a regime change, will be directly 
proportional to the level of post-conflict democracy, stability and prosperity resulting 
from each operation.  In other words, the current democratization strategy has not only 
committed America to potential action against a range of non-democratic regimes but 
also to the requisite peacebuilding operations required in the wake of such action.  For 
this reason, the definition of “mission accomplished” has been extended to the post-
conflict reconstruction phase and due recognition has been given to the potential 
challenges that are inherent in the establishment of liberal governance in post-conflict 
areas.   
Evidence of this broadened U.S. commitment can be seen in recent White House, 
Department of State and Department of Defense directives.  In November 2005, the U.S. 
Department of Defense issued a directive defining stability operations as "a core U.S. 
military mission" with "priority comparable to combat operations."  According to the 
directive, "stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations" should "lead to 
sustainable peace. . . The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for 
securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, 
and a robust civil society."170   In December 2005, the White House announced a 
Presidential Directive to improve the management of U.S. efforts in this regard.  These 
initiatives were echoed in the 2006 National Security Strategy which highlighted this 
initiative and stated that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization under the Secretary of State draws on all relevant U.S. government agencies 
and integrates its work with that of the U.S military.171  
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Perhaps the clearest indication of this newly defined post-conflict obligation can 
be seen in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review: 
Assistance [including post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction] in 
today's environment relies on the ability to improve states' governance, 
administration, internal security and the rule of law in order to build 
partner governments' legitimacy in the eyes of their own people and 
thereby inoculate societies against terrorism, insurgency and non-state 
threats.  In partnership with the State Department and others, the 
[Defense] Department must become as adept at working with foreign 
constabularies as it is with externally-focused armed forces, and as adept 
at working with interior ministries as it is with defense ministries — a 
substantial shift of emphasis that demands broader and more flexible legal 
authorities and cooperative mechanisms.172 
However, the paradigm of democratization through which the United States is seeking to 
achieve this post-conflict transformation may be precisely one of the forces creating 
vulnerability and instability.    
C. INSTABILITY THROUGH DEMOCRATIZATION  
In the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush assured the world that 
“America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic 
openness…because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international 
order.”173  This goal may show promise in cases in which authoritarian regimes seek to 
reap the benefits of the global market.  However, war-torn states such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan have thus far encountered great difficulties in coping with the rapid injection 
of political and market competition.   
Roland Paris notes that most modern peacebuilding operations center around “[a] 
single paradigm – liberal internationalism.”174  This paradigm assumes that the surest 
foundation for peace both within and between states is market democracy, that is, “a 
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liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.”175  However, in his article 
Paris highlighted the unsuitability of both in areas still reeling from conflict.  He 
contended that there are “inherently destabilizing side effects [associated with] … this 
remedy”176 in view of the lack of success to date in seven of eight recent international 
peacebuilding operations around the world.  The implications of his conclusions for U.S. 
democratization strategy seem clear.   
Rightly illuminating the cause of incongruence, Paris stated, “both democracy and 
capitalism encourage conflict and competition – indeed, they thrive on it.”177  He noted 
that “[w]ar-shattered states are typically ill equipped to manage societal competition 
induced by political and economic liberalization, not only because these states have a 
recent history of violence, but because they typically lack the institutional structures 
capable of peacefully resolving internal disputes.  In these circumstances, efforts to 
transform war-shattered states into market democracies can serve to exacerbate rather 
than moderate societal conflicts.”178  Citing eight major peacebuilding operations on five 
continents, Paris noted that only one of those eight, Namibia, might be considered a 
success.  All other attempts he highlighted – Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Rwanda – were doomed by the “liberal internationalist 
paradigm of peacebuilding” which has “exacerbated social tensions and thus contributed 
to the continuation or renewal of instability.”179  More specifically, he argues that, among 
other factors, the process of political liberalization has “generated destabilizing and 
unforeseen side effects that have impeded the consolidation of stable peace.”180  This 
persistent source of instability and its resulting undesired side effects constitute additional 
obstacles to the success of the current U.S. democratization strategy in the Middle East.  
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D. POLITICAL FRAILTY 
It has been said that a healthy democracy thrives on energetic political discourse.   
It requires “a politically active and involved citizenry…to counterbalance and scrutinize 
the power of the state and to provide channels for political expression.”181  This 
“involved citizenry” is characterized by civic institutions, organizations and associations 
which serve the purpose of “catalyzing competing societal interests.”182  In the end, it is 
this public debate which, Paris noted, “feeds into the policymaking process, which in 
principle permits democratic governments to devise policies and practices that reflect 
shifting public attitudes.”  In essence, “democracy paradoxically encourages the public 
expression of conflicting interests in order to limit the intensity of such conflicts by 
channeling them through peaceful political institutions before they turn violent.”183  
Problems arise, however, when, as author Robert Dahl notes, “citizen associations foster 
parochial exclusiveness among their members at the expense of concerns for the broader 
public good.”184  Indeed, this may be exactly the dilemma faced today in Iraq and that 
which will continue to burden the effort to democratize the Middle East.   
Brian Whitaker, the Middle East editor of the Guardian, has argued185 that the 
difficulties of the establishment of democracy in the Middle East partly stem from the 
imperial legacy in the region and the resulting existence of significant minorities within 
individual Middle Eastern states.  While stark differences have often been suppressed in 
the cause of national unity, this apparent unity merely obscured the fact that a minority 
elite controlled the country.  Thus, when democracy is hastily implemented, political 
affiliations are most often linked with ethnic or religious divisions rather than with public 
policy issues. This phenomenon intensely polarizes the population into starkly separated 
and often rival communities and thus undermines stability efforts.  National public 
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concerns are subordinated to ethnic or sectarian competition.  The December 2005 
legislative elections in Iraq illustrate this point clearly.   
Shia Iraqis make up about 60% of the Iraqi population, and the Shia coalition 
therefore won the election.  However, while this outcome might have been expected, the 
more pertinent observation concerns the almost total lack of cross-ethnic and cross-
sectarian voting.  Shia candidates won almost no votes in either the Kurdish or Sunni 
constituencies, which roughly divide the remaining population equally.  Conversely, the 
Kurdish and Sunni parties garnered no support outside their respective communities.  The 
U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, Zilmay Khalilzad, concluded that “people have preferred to 
vote for their ethnic or sectarian identities, but for Iraq to succeed there has to be cross-
ethnic and cross-sectarian co-operation.”186  The invasion eliminated Saddam Hussein’s 
authoritarian regime but, as Mitchell Cohen, Professor of nineteenth and twentieth 
century political theory and contemporary European and Middle Eastern politics at 
Columbia University, noted, the U.S. “anti-totalitarianism approach assumed Iraqi 
Jeffersonians would emerge from the big bang.  Instead, Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds were 
there.”187   
The existence of such a starkly polarized populace naturally raises concerns about 
the emergence of factions which appeal to groups of unified identity that maintain a 
growing sense of political disenfranchisement and increasingly consolidate around ethnic, 
religious, or tribal associations.  Indeed, ever increasing anti-Americanism in the region 
has made it not only possible but probable that anti-Western Islamic parties will actually 
gain power through open and free elections.  Here the words of James Madison are 
uncomfortably apropos.   
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous 
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and 
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public 
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are  
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too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the 
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing 
majority. 188  
Over two hundred years later similar complaints can be heard regarding the 
viability of democracy in the Middle East.  However, it might be difficult to replicate 
America’s lasting success in Middle Eastern conditions.  In 2003, a classified State 
Department report stated that “Electoral democracy, were it to emerge, could well be 
subject to exploitation by anti-American elements.”189    Indeed, victories by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine serve as striking 
examples of this negative effect and constitute yet another obstacle to the success of the 
U.S. strategy.  In 2006, Michael Ledeen, resident scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute, wrote, “In the abstract, it’s hard to imagine a representative government in Iraq 
without what we call fundamentalists in it.  They are part of the population.  They will 
participate.”190    Moqtada al-Sadr’s newly acquired control of a significant bloc within 
the Iraqi parliament seems to have vindicated his disheartening prediction. 
Lastly, if the administration’s pre-invasion rhetoric is rightly understood, WMD-
armed terrorists could commit acts of violence even greater than those already committed 
on American soil.  As Walter McDougall points out, however, “Western Europe was the 
Number One haven for terrorists outside Afghanistan.”191  Thus, it was precisely the 
freedoms of the West which the perpetrators of the attacks of 11 September 2001 were 
able to exploit to their malevolent advantage.   As recent investigations into the 
madrassas and mosques of London have confirmed, free societies may offer a venue for 
exploitation by radical fundamentalist organizations.      
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E. IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE AND THE TRANSFER OF LIBERAL 
SOCIETAL NORMS 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the success of U.S. democratization 
strategy is largely reliant upon the feasibility of the successful alignment of Western, 
liberal values with the ideological proclivities of each targeted society.  Specifically, as 
current actions in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the most prominent efforts of the 
ongoing U.S. democratization strategy, ideological congruence will have to be 
established between Western democratic norms and those of the culture and religion of 
Islam.  While “President Bush believes that democracy and Islam can coexist,”192 
significant opinions exist on either side of the argument.  Unfortunately, the bleak track 
record of successful democratization in predominantly Muslim societies provides no 
source for optimism.  In 1999, a study by Arend Lijphart concluded that a total of 36 
countries could be considered stable democracies over the previous 20 years. Of those 
thirty-six, “none has an Islamic majority.”193  
Much of the lack of ideological alignment thus far in Iraq can be blamed on the 
perceived shallowness of the West’s message.  American efforts in the “battle for the 
hearts and minds” in the Middle East have relied upon the appeal of the spoils of liberty 
instead of focusing on its acknowledgement of mankind’s inalienable rights recognized 
over two centuries ago as being  “endowed by their creator.”194  Indeed, it is the Western 
philosophical understanding of the “sanctity of the individual and the inviolability of 
conscience”195 which has given birth to freedom and democracy.   However, the 
emphasis on issues such as universal suffrage and economic freedom without a 
recognition and appreciation for the deeply rooted philosophical convictions behind such 
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ideas has rendered the West’s message a shallow call to materialism and self-indulgence. 
Robert Reilly, a former director of the Voice of America, explained the effect.  “The 
mantra of freedom — unconnected to any higher purpose – translates as a form of 
materialism.”196 
He points out that the intellectual argument has thus been reduced to a choice: 
“greater freedom with no purpose or personal submission to a higher purpose.”197  It is 
becoming more and more evident that many Muslims, even those of relative affluence, 
have opted for the latter.  Instead of providing a transcendent alternative, America is 
allowing the target population to conclude that the West is “indifferent to various claims 
to truth.”198 
The Allied message against National Socialism during World War II, the same 
message which was later turned successfully against communism, had a clear and distinct 
advantage in that war of ideas.  Hitler’s and Stalin’s messages were empty, void of any 
underlying theological meaning or appreciation for God-given inalienable rights. 
Unfortunately, because of American reluctance to fight a war of theological ideas  in the 
Middle East (let alone  to continue to recognize them at home), the democratization 
strategy has been reduced, according to Professor Harry V. Jaffa,  to “telling others to 
accept the forms of our own political institutions, without reference to the principles or 
convictions that give rise to those institutions.”199  
Skepticism about the true prospects of successful democratization in the Middle 
East has been deplored by President Bush as “cultural condescension.”200 However, the 
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lack of appreciation for cultural and historical anomalies could lead to grave 
miscalculations regarding the expected outcomes of future U.S. interventions. While a 
theological analysis of the tenets of the Islamic faith is clearly outside the purview of this 
thesis, the relative dearth of democratic governance in Islamic countries provides strong 
evidence of an inherent cultural aversion to Western-style liberalism.  Abdou Filali-
Ansary, director of the King Abdul-Aziz al-Saoud Foundation for Islamic Studies and 
Human Sciences, believes that this aversion finds its roots not within the theological 
heritage of the Islamic faith, but instead in the effects of the “nineteenth century 
encounter of Muslims with the modernizing West.”201   
Filali-Ansary contended that the Muslim aversion to secularism derives from a 
“tenacious misunderstanding” born of linguistic confusion which blurred the difference 
between “secularists” (or “temporalists”202) and “atheists.”  He concluded that an 
inaccurate and unfortunate choice of terminology “implicitly equated these nineteenth-
century positivists with the seventh-century opponents of the Prophet [Mohammed].”  It 
is this unfortunate formulation which has “defined the terms of a large and enduring 
misunderstanding” in which “secularism was seen as being intimately related to, if not 
simply the same thing as, atheism.”  A resulting bipolar opposition has, since then, been 
deeply entrenched in Muslim societies.  According to Filali-Ansary, 
The feeling that has prevailed since then among Muslims is that there is a 
strict and irreducible opposition between two systems – Islam and non-
Islam.  To be a secularist has meant to abandon Islam, to reject altogether 
not only the religious faith but also its attendant morality and the traditions 
and rules that operate within Muslim societies.  It therefore has been 
understood as a total alienation from the constituent elements of the 
Islamic personality and as a complete surrender to unbelief, immorality, 
and self-hatred, leading to a disavowal of the historic identity and 
civilization inherited from illustrious ancestors. 203 
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Thus, in contrast with the Western world, of which it could be said that a 
distinction came to exist between “Christianity” – the religion of the followers of Christ 
and his teachings – and “Christendom” – the territory, culture and society in which the 
Christian faith predominated, the term “Islam” has become all encompassing.  Indeed, as 
Filali-Ansary, pointed out, “The same word was, and still is, used to refer to both a set of 
beliefs and rituals and to the life of the community of believers through time and 
space.”204    This predisposition presents the most significant obstacle to the acceptance 
of liberal democratic ideals in Muslim societies.  The absence of what Filali-Ansary 
conceptualized as “Islamdom” has overshadowed the overriding perception of societal 
order.  Because, Muslims in Islamic societies neither acknowledge nor in fact even 
recognize any difference between religion and society within their own culture, they 
reject Western political liberalism as a highway to cultural decadence.  Thus, it might be 
said that for Muslims, the principles of the “Rights of Man” not only laid the groundwork 
for liberty but also for licentiousness.   In essence, in the minds of members of 
fundamentalist Islamic societies, the pen of Thomas Paine is irrevocably wedded to the 
camera of Robert Mapplethorpe, whose work would be regarded as an abomination by 
pious Muslims.  As a result Western-style political ideology is perceived as a “Trojan 
horse” for moral decline.205  
In the words of Dinesh D’Souza, “What angers religious Muslims is not the 
American Constitution but the scandalous sexual mores they see on television.”206  In 
this regard, another challenge to the U.S. democratization strategy may reside in the 
successful “de-secularizing” of liberal governance.  In other words, Islamic acceptance of 
democratic institutions may depend on the possibility of separating Western cultural 
norms from Western ideas on social order.  Even if this could be done, however, peaceful 
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coexistence between Islamic democracies (or what Filali-Ansary proposed as “guided” 
democracies) or between Western and Islamic democracies is untested and in no way 
guaranteed.  
An additional source of Western and Middle Eastern ideological divergence 
which provides significant obstacles to U.S. democratization efforts can be found much 
earlier than the “nineteenth-century encounter of Muslims with the modernizing 
West.”207   The lasting impact of two significant cultural events in Western history, the 
Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution, must not be overlooked.  Hagen 
Schulz rightly acknowledged the epochal significance of the West’s transition to 
secularized rule beginning with the Protestant Reformation.  “The background to this 
radical change was a break in historical continuity comparable only to that radical 
transformation that had once turned bands of Neolithic hunters and food-gathers into 
organized communities of arable farmers, stock breeders and town dwellers.”208   An 
analogous transition never occurred in Islamic society.209   
However, the magnitude of the change represented by the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, and the French Revolution should not be ignored for it was as much a 
colossal shift in power and influence as it was a radical transformation of the ideological 
world view of Western civilization down to the present day.    Notably, it is this transition 
to a new Weltanschauung which most closely embodies the ultimate goal of the current 
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U.S. democratization strategy.  As Roland Paris notes, “Peacebuilding is in effect an 
enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting 
Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in 
order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic 
liberalization.”210  The ongoing friction faced today in Iraq and Afghanistan illuminates 
foreboding obstacles which are likely to persist in efforts to democratize the Middle East.  
Unfortunately, the essential “social engineering,” that at the level of values, seems most often 
overlooked – trumped by expectations that an effective transition to Western-style political 
and economic modernization can be accomplished through the adoption of procedural forms, 
such as elections and universal suffrage.    
In Western societies, however, the ideological changes of the Reformation and the 
wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries laid the philosophical ground work 
for the political, social and economic changes which followed.  Thus the challenge to U.S. 
(and NATO) democratization efforts is the successful accomplishment of an analogous – and 
no less momentous – transition in Islamic societies through the surgical transplant of 
Western-style politics and economics.  As the centuries-long democratization process of 
Western societies suggests, such a transition will necessitate a significant marginalization of 
the prevailing religion and culture, and will probably require continued engagement of 
military personnel from the United States and coalition members.     
There are two sources from which such an ideological transition could emerge to 
enable the democratic transition of future states within the region.  First, as was the case with 
the influential seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers of Europe, this change could 
be fostered internally through the free expression of convincing liberal ideas.  Secondly, this 
change could be forced upon a society by a powerful external source, such as the United 
States, which effectively destroys or significantly marginalizes the previously dominant 
ideology.  It seems quite clear, however, that at this time neither option is reasonably 
available to the United States and its coalition partners with regard to the Middle East.    
Effective totalitarian regimes are able to greatly restrict free expression and thus 
any internal dissent is quickly and firmly quashed.  Reuel Marc Gerecht, writing in the 
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New York Times, praised the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as a reasonable cleric, who is 
“far and away the most respected person in Iraq” and “who is known for his strong 
aversion to mixing politics and faith.” 211  Yet it is reported that the ayatollah’s website 
portrayed a far less tolerant disposition.  “The ruling upon them [that slander Islam]” he 
stated, “is death”.212    Such characteristic intolerance provides little hope that effective 
ideological change might come from within oppressive Islamic regimes.   
Externally induced ideological change has, however, been the hopeful mechanism 
of the current U.S.- and/or NATO-led efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In fact, in the oft-
cited democratic transitions of both Japan and Germany, President Bush invokes 
precisely the sort of ideological shift that is expected in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Certainly, 
the President’s historical assertion is correct, and healthy democracies in Japan and 
Germany are a vindication of those who believed in the democratic potential of these 
nations.  Yet this assertion fails to take into account the amount of material and human 
destruction which was required to render receptive the ideological palates of German and 
Japanese citizens.  Both societies had to be essentially reduced to rubble to achieve their 
capitulation.  The establishment of democratic rule required considerable supervision and 
effort.  Such a commitment of blood and treasure by the United States and coalition 
partners appears implausible in the foreseeable future.  This reticence might actually 
provide another obstacle to the fulfillment of the strategy – that is, the maintenance of 
lasting public support at home while trying to forcibly impose this significant level of 
ideological change.  In the end, it may be this challenge which proves the most 
formidable obstacle to the success of U.S. democratization strategy.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Immanuel Kant enthusiastically supported the American cause in the war of 
independence against Great Britain.    As “a republican and a humanitarian,” Kant was 
entirely devoted to the idea of the universal rights of mankind and understood war to be 
“the supreme obstacle to be overcome on the hard road toward securing these rights.”213  
His vision in Perpetual Peace provided a remedy.  Republicanism was for Kant both the 
means by which to secure these universal rights as well as the final solution to rid the 
world of the scourge of war, which was attributed to the dynastic and autocratic political 
structure of the European continent.  Yet to depict Kant as an idealistic pacifist would be 
a gross mischaracterization.  The German philosopher had, in fact, welcomed the 
Revolution in France and remained fervently supportive, despite the tyranny of the 
Jacobin Reign of Terror.  For Kant, it seemed, the ends – that is, securing mankind’s 
immutable rights – justified whatever blood stained means were necessary to bring about 
such a transition.  In the end the happiness of all of humanity depended upon it.   
A. THE TEMPERING OF LIBERAL IDEALISM IN AMERICA’S 
FOUNDING IDEOLOGY 
This same uncompromising spirit can be heard in the writings and speeches of 
some of America’s most famous founding fathers.  Political freedom was a nonnegotiable 
right for men such as Patrick Henry, who declared , “give me liberty, or give me 
death!”214    Yet, while sacrificing for the freedom of one’s countrymen is a noble and 
often unavoidable duty, Kant’s vision was far broader than Henry’s personalized 
evocation.  Kant’s vision was closer to that of Thomas Jefferson, who held in the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence that liberty was not merely an American privilege, but owed 
to all men, who had been created equal and “endowed by their creator with [inherent and] 
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certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”215  Since the establishment of the United States, much of the challenging 
duality of American foreign policy has derived from the effort to reconcile two often 
competing intentions: the necessity to defend the freedoms of Americans and the 
perceived obligation to extend those freedoms to others.  The latter has not always been 
in America’s immediate security interests.   
Indeed, less than fifty years after its establishment in Independence Hall, the 
United States would be forced to choose between its immediate security interests and its 
dedication to avowed principles of liberty.  Through his authorship of the Monroe 
Doctrine, John Quincy Adams realigned American interests away from Kantian idealism 
towards a foreign policy devoted primarily to protecting American interests in the 
Western Hemisphere.  While an alliance with other fledgling constitutional governments 
would have been consistent with an ideological endorsement of the liberal ideals of the 
dawning age, it might well have cost the United States prestige, safety and autonomy.  
Adams chose restraint in the defense of American ideals and arguably changed the course 
of history.  By checking the American predilection towards Kantian idealism, he initiated 
almost a century of realist-inspired foreign policy and put America’s status as a rising 
world power on a firm foundation.   
B. WILSON’S SOLUTION  
The end of the nineteenth century brought rapid and dramatic change.  Like the 
complementary gale force winds of a perfect storm, the increased lethality of the state 
was united with another powerful force of social identity, nationalism.  Coalescing 
around basic associations such as language and history, this powerful ideological 
stimulus turned Europe into “the scene of some of the most savage episodes of collective 
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violence in the recorded history of the human species.”216  Nationalist fervor not only 
sacrificed a generation of young men in many countries but accounted for shameful 
instances of cruelty against humanity in much of Europe.  President Woodrow Wilson 
identified the root cause of this tragedy in national political systems and found a remedy 
in Kantian idealism.  Democracy, Wilson was convinced, would overcome such 
malevolent discord and create a lasting “League of Peace” to prevent any repetition of the 
deplorable losses the world had just witnessed. 
U.S. forces joined the war effort in part “to make the world safe for democracy,” 
yet Wilson’s vision suffered its most stinging defeat at home.  Taking a position 
comparable that of John Quincy Adams a century before, Henry Cabot Lodge and other 
opponents of the League of Nations rejected the subordination of American interests to 
ideological commitments abroad and in the end, defeated the rising Kantian idealism of 
Wilson’s proposed League of Nations. “The United States is the world's best hope,” 
Lodge said, “but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other nations, if you 
tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her powerful good, and endanger 
her very existence. Leave her to march freely through the centuries to come, as in the 
years that have gone. Strong, generous, and confident, she has nobly served mankind. 
Beware how you trifle with your marvelous inheritance; this great land of ordered liberty. 
For if we stumble and fall, freedom and civilization everywhere will go down in ruin.”217 
Though President Wilson did not live to see the fulfillment of his vision, his 
idealism rose again in the shadow of the Second World War and the threat of 
communism.  Indeed, Kantian and Wilsonian ideas echoed loudly in the rhetoric of 
American foreign policy throughout the Cold War.  The United States extolled the 
fundamental rights of freedom and liberty in the face of Soviet oppression.  However, a 
convenient marriage had been achieved.  The spread of communist ideology not only 
threatened democratic and liberal ideals overseas, but also America itself, owing to 
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Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and other capabilities.  American security 
interests and American ideological commitments were aligned.  In effect, realism and 
idealism dictated the same policy prescriptions.  Protecting America’s physical security 
was consistent with promoting its ideology. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, while Kantian and Wilsonian idealism 
would not completely fade from the agenda, U.S. foreign policy favored realism-inspired 
pursuits void of any consistent and all-encompassing strategy.  The election of George 
W. Bush seemed to signal a continuation of this new national rhetoric.  However, early 
events in his Presidency had a profound effect on U.S. foreign policy and ushered in a 
revitalization of Kantian and Wilsonian idealism. 
C. A KANTIAN AND WILSONIAN RENAISSANCE 
The administration of President George W. Bush has provided a unique 
opportunity to highlight the impact of global events on the character of U.S. foreign 
policy and to recognize the continuing influence of Kantian and Wilsonian idealism, 
which has risen again to prominence in American foreign policy.  In 2000 Condoleezza 
Rice put forth a criticism of America’s ongoing lack luster approach to foreign policy 
which, she contended, had dominated the post-Cold War era.  Eight years later, after two 
terms as an influential member of the George W. Bush administration, she provided a 
review of the administration’s course of action and its current vision for the future of 
American foreign policy.218   
Noting the administration’s initial commitment to a more realist, America-first 
disposition, Rice concedes that it undertook a distinct “departure from prior policy,”219 
particularly in the Middle East.  Indeed, in the wake of the terror attacks of 11 September 
2001, the administration broke from a long standing U.S. strategy which “focused almost 
exclusively on stability”220 and became increasingly dominated by idealistic notions of 
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“good vs. evil” and promoting regional democratization.  The seemingly successful 
elimination of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in late 2001 gave ample hope that a wave of 
democratic transition was underway in areas which had thus far been untouched by 
liberal governance.  In addition, a growing sense of urgency about the potential for Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea to pass WMD to terrorist organizations pushed the administration 
ever nearer the option of preemptive strike. 
From one perspective it might be argued that the March 2003 invasion of Iraq 
signified the reunification of America’s security interests and its democratic ideals.   
Eliminating the regime of Saddam Hussein would remove the threat of WMD production 
and transfer by that regime, but also spread the freedom and liberty that Americans enjoy 
to a part of the world which had known only oppression for millennia.  The 
administration therefore, at least in a broad sense, revived a Cold War strategy.  
However, the dual pillars of American “power and principle”221 were not used to contain 
a growing ideology, but as grounds for a preemptive invasion.  The failure to find WMD 
after the invasion of Iraq, however, forced a second decisive shift in the administration’s 
foreign policy.  Without any evidence of a direct threat to U.S. national security in Iraq, 
America’s declared mission in this country became almost purely an expression of 
Kantian and Wilsonian idealism.  The success of this endeavor is threatened by enormous 
obstacles which must be addressed.   
D. THE DEBATABLE COGENCY OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
Whether to hasten the immediate success of the U.S. democratization strategy or 
perhaps to refine its scope, significant obstacles must be first acknowledged and, if 
possible, overcome.  As discussed previously, three major obstacles stand out.  First and 
foremost among these is the debatable cogency of democratic peace theory.  On 21 
March 2006, President Bush asserted that one of the reasons for America’s invasion of 
Iraq was to “lay peace” because “history has proven that democracies don't war.”222 Over 
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fifty years of “democratic” peace in Europe have at first glance made this contention 
difficult to challenge.  However, while a correlation between democracy and peace could 
likely be established, this relationship is, upon closer review, less causal than has been 
widely assumed.  Among other factors, as noted in Chapter IV, overwhelming American 
political-military influence in regions of assumed “democratic peace” may matter more 
than the regime type of the states in these regions.   
With this in mind, the first obstacle to the fulfillment of U.S. democratization 
strategy can be identified – that is, democratic peace in the Middle East would likely 
require at least the same level of U.S. regional hegemony that was necessary for its 
attainment in Europe.  Condoleezza Rice acknowledged this required level of 
commitment.   Referring to the ongoing democratization effort in Afghanistan, she wrote, 
“We can succeed…but we must be prepared to sustain a partnership with that new 
democracy for many years to come.”223  Since the terrorist threat to the United States is 
hardly equivalent to that once posed by the Soviet Union, and the extensive transnational 
cultural and familial links such as those which existed between America and Europe after 
World War II have no equivalent in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, domestic support 
for such an extended effort will be difficult to sustain.  Indeed, current U.S. opinion polls 
show less than robust support for U.S. efforts in the Middle East.   In April 2008, Gallup 
Poll reported that public discontent about the Iraq war reached a new high.  Sixty-three 
percent of Americans surveyed said that sending troops into Iraq was a mistake.224   
More recently, a CNN opinion poll from 28-31 August 2008 indicated that only 35% of 
the Americans polled continue to support U.S. engagement in the Iraq War.225  It seems 
plausible that public support could decline the longer U.S. troops remain in Iraq.  
Democratic peace theory also warrants critical scrutiny in light of the requisite 
conditions for peace.  While the theory may be valid for certain liberal established 
democratic governments, no positive assumptions should be made regarding peaceful 
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interactions among illiberal democratic regimes.  If, as President Bush stated, the United 
States truly has “no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new 
government,”226 Washington will have no means by which to ensure the establishment of 
peace-oriented democratic characteristics.  In mid-2008, Rice, however, expressed the 
administration’s growing recognition of the necessity for far greater American 
involvement to ensure “positive” political maturity.  “The task for us,” she wrote, “is to 
support and shape these difficult processes of change and to help the nations of the region 
overcome several major challenges to their emergence as modern democratic states.”227 
This increased U.S. involvement to influence political developments in the various states 
of the Middle East will, however, probably elicit greater regional animosity, at least in 
some quarters, regarding perceived American “meddling.” 
Lastly, as Rakenrud and Hegre228 have shown, while the dyadic relationship 
among co-existing democracies has proven to be highly stable, the least stable 
relationship is a mixed dyad involving democratic and non-democratic regimes.   By 
extension, to avoid enduring conflict in a region, particularly one in which a liberal 
democracy is isolated among non-democratic regimes, there exists no alternative but to 
force the democratization of the surrounding non-democratic regimes.  In essence, to 
actualize the promises of democratic peace theory, it might be logically argued that the 
United States must commit itself to what would likely be the forceful transformation of 
all the non-democracies in the region.  It is quite possible that the continuing Iranian 
pursuit of nuclear weapons capability reflects a tacit recognition among Tehran’s political 
elites of this perceived U.S. objective.  Critics might readily conclude that the U.S. 
democratization effort, at least in Iraq, has had the unintended effect of making Middle 
Eastern instability significantly more dangerous. 
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E. DEMOCRATIC INSTABILITY 
Another obstacle to the successful pursuit of U.S. democratization strategy is the 
potential for instability, which can result from the conflict and competition inherent in the nature 
of democracy.  As Condoleezza Rice noted, “few nations begin the democratic journey with a 
democratic culture.”229  Vigorous debate is often seen as the clearest sign of a healthy 
democracy.  However, Rice observed, states transitioning from highly autocratic rule have 
“virtually no legitimate channels for political expression”230 and thus are unable to adequately 
contain debate and redirect conflicts toward compromise.  Without such channels, democracy 
often becomes fiercely polarizing.  Public debate exacerbates deep and hostile divisions along 
cultural, sectarian or religious dividing lines.  The resulting perception of disenfranchisement can 
serve as a catalyst for violence, particularly regarding issues of religion.  It is this “untidiness of 
democracy” which, Secretary Rice wrote, has led many to doubt the prudence of imposing certain 
features of a liberal polity in weakened states such as Iraq. 231 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, religious and sectarian divisions in the Middle 
East, which had existed for millennia, were arbitrarily overlaid with national identities and 
borders defined mainly by British and French diplomats.  As a result, post-conflict reconciliation 
in Iraq has faced significant obstacles – including the differences dividing the Sunnis, the Shiites 
and the Kurds.  The establishment of functioning and progressive democracies in the region thus 
remains a distant goal.  Internal differences and deep-rooted cultural outlooks constitute 
enormous obstacles.  As recent elections in Iraq have shown, barring the cultivation of healthy 
and progressive discourse across religious and sectarian divisions, the political process will 
remain starkly polarized and thus ineffective in diffusing antagonism.  The risk of violence and 
instability will accordingly persist.  The Bush administration has commenced the implementation 
of its democratization strategy in one of the most fiercely segregated regions of the world.  If, as 
Rice wrote, “Iraq is a microcosm of the region, with its layers of ethnic and sectarian 
diversity,”232 the pursuit of the strategy within this region is a challenging objective indeed. 
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An additional daunting reality is that a liberated, highly devout populace may 
freely elect parties closely aligned with terrorism and in fact opposed to democracy.   
According to Rice, “As difficult as this problem is, it cannot be the case that people are 
denied the right to vote, just because the outcome might be unpleasant to us.”233 Rice 
acknowledged such cases as the 2004 election of Hamas in Palestine, but contended that 
international scrutiny has made it resoundingly clear that “you can be a terrorist group or 
you can be a political party, but you cannot be both.”234  Unless the United States is 
prepared to “undo” such valid elections by force, this character duality is, despite Rice’s 
assertion, entirely possible.  In fact, in regions dominated by radical Islamic 
fundamentalism, it is extremely probable. In the words of Lord Acton, “The one 
pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather of that party, not 
always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections.”235 
F. IDEOLOGICAL INCONGRUENCE 
The final and perhaps most significant obstacle facing the Bush administration’s 
democratization strategy is the overall incongruence of the ideas of Western liberalism 
and fundamentalist Islamic ideology.  The regrettable reality that, five years after the 
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, the liberated continue to take up arms against their 
liberators is an ominous signal of significant ideological discord.  Indeed, perhaps the 
greatest shortcoming of the current strategy has less to do with its misunderstanding of 
Middle Eastern cultures than with its wanton disregard of the history of Western political 
culture.  Modern liberal governance in the West did not arise in conjunction with the 
theocratic orientation of medieval Christendom.  Instead, through the cataclysmic effects 
of the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution, 
conceptions of democratic rights and popular rule gained legitimacy over a period of 
several centuries. The expectation that a comparable ideological transformation might 
arise from within oppressive authoritarian religion-centered regimes seems remarkably 
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optimistic.  Current democratization efforts are an attempt to impose a U.S.-style 
ideological reorientation on societies which have not experienced pivotal “ripening” 
events analogous to the Reformation and the Enlightenment.  Tom Teepen notes that 
Americans should look favorably on President Bush “for promoting democracy as a core 
theme of his presidency,” but points out that he has erred by “failing to heed our own 
history.”236  A clearer awareness of the tremendous amount of time required for the 
democratic transformation in the West would counsel patience and restraint rather than 
forceful attempts to accelerate political and social change.  
Condoleezza Rice wrote, “Democracy, it is said, cannot be imposed, particularly 
by a foreign power. This is true but beside the point.”237  In fact, it is exactly the point, 
for it is the very foundation of ongoing U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  If the 
forcible imposition of liberalism can be successful only in rare circumstances, as 
discussed in Chapter IV, the expected Kantian and Wilsonian peace – the desired end-
state of the current democratization strategy – may not be readily attained, especially in 
the adverse conditions of the Middle East.  In the meantime, moreover, Americans may 
be less safe.  They may have to either continue to risk the lives of military personnel 
through a full-blown commitment to an overwhelming and enduring “guiding” presence 
in the region, or by withdrawal, accept the precarious consequences of significantly more 
instability in the Middle East.  
Noble in its ideals, the current U.S. democratization strategy faces significant 
obstacles which threaten its success and raise important questions about its overall 
suitability as the foundation of a national strategy.  Like the strategy, the answer can be 
bifurcated into both realist and idealist concerns.  From a realist perspective, significant 
consideration should be given to the practicality of the objective.  Combat with resurgent 
Taliban forces in Afghanistan will demand increased troop strength, and the fledgling 
Iraqi democracy will require an ongoing U.S. military presence for years to come.   
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Meanwhile, U.S. support for pockets of democracy in the Caucasus has pitted 
America against an adversary far more powerful than any it will face in the Middle 
East, Russia.  While the spread of democracy around the world might eventually 
deliver the peace it has promised, it is becoming more and more evident that the 
forceful promotion of this transition has jeopardized its fulfillment by overtaxing the 
political, economic and military solvency of the United States. “The potential for 
cautious democratic advance,” notes Teepen, “has been set back by democracy 
recklessly asserted beyond our [America’s] willingness or ability to defend it.”238   
From a long-term historical perspective, it should be asked whether the 
aggressive pursuit of a global democratic transition could tarnish what the United 
States has always considered its sacred birthright, liberty.  To ascertain the 
genuineness of such a risk, one might reconsider what John Quincy Adams, then U.S. 
Secretary of State, said on the anniversary of the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 
1821:   
She [America] well knows that by once enlisting under other banners 
than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she 
would involve herself, beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars 
of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, 
which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.  The 
fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from 
liberty to force.  The frontlet upon her brows would no longer beam 
with the ineffable splendor of freedom and independence; but in its 
stead would soon be substituted an imperial diadem, flashing in false 
and tarnished lustre the murky radiance of dominion and power.  She 
might become the dictatress of the world: she would be no longer the 
ruler of her own spirit.239   
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Whether the continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
elsewhere in the Middle East will bring about democratic change remains to be seen.  
The more important question, however, is determining to what extent and in which 
circumstances democratization is a legitimate ideological foundation for future U.S. 
policy.  It is safe to say that John Quincy Adams would recommend caution, restraint, 
and selectivity in pursuing the goal of democratization overseas. 
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